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From Sick Chicken to Synar:
The Evolution and Subsequent De-Evolution of
the Separation of Powers*
Stephen L. Carter**
I. INTRODUCTION
I shall discuss two competing strands in the loosely woven
jurisprudence that the Supreme Court has created to resolve
controversies regarding the separation of powers in the federal
government. One of these I called the "evolutionary tradition."!
The evolutionary tradition emphasizes the need to adapt the
powers of the federal government to the perceived demands of a
changing society. This tradition is highlighted by a deference to
the congressional judgment on the most effective means for de-
ploying its authority. The judicial approval of the creation of
quasi-executive, quasi-legislative agencies, beyond the immedi-
ate control of either of the political branches, provides perhaps
the best example of this evolutionary tradition.2
The countervailing strand is the "de-evolutionary tradi-
tion." I call it "de-evolutionary" rather than "non-evolutionary"
* The title of this paper is inspired by the title of one of the greatest essays ever
written on the game of baseball: Roger Angell's classic, The Flowering and Subsequent
Deflowering of New England, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 28, 1967, at 176, reprinted in THE
THIRD FIRESIDE BOOK OF BASEBALL 27 (C. Einstein ed. 1968).
** Professor of Law, Yale University. This paper formed the basis of a presentation
at the Federalist Society Symposium on the Separation of Powers in Chicago, Illinois, on
November 16-17, 1986. A revised version was presented at a faculty workshop at the Yale
Law School on January 26, 1987. Although many people on both occasions provided im-
portant criticism and advice, I would especially like to thank Enola Aird, Akhil Amar,
Lea Brilmayer, Guido Calabresi, Drew Days, Geoffrey Hazard, Jerry Mashaw, Michael
McConnell, Jeff Powell, George Priest, Peter Strauss, Cass Sunstein, Ruth Wedgwood,
and Harry Wellington for asking the hard questions about the earlier drafts.
1. I borrow the term "evolutionary tradition" from my colleague E. Donald Elliott.
See Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985).
As will become clear, however, the uses to which he and I put the term are quite
different.
2. The case marking formal judicial approval of the independence of the agencies is
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), discussed infra at text accompa-
nying notes 33-43. A nice historical overview is Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical
Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986).
719
HeinOnline -- 1987 BYU L. Rev. 720 1987
720 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1987
because it is not preservative. Rather, the de-evolutionary tradi-
tion actively seeks return to a system of balanced and separated
powers modeled closely on the governmental design that the
Framers had in mind when they established a constitutional
government. This tradition rejects the view that evolution in the
larger society requires a concomitant evolution in the manner in
which the federal government organizes itself for the exercise of
power. In an earlier era, the de-evolutionary tradition was repre-
sented by the Supreme Court's effort to use the non-delegation
doctrine to halt the New Deal.s More recently, this de-evolution-
ary tradition has led to the Court's decisions to strike down the
legislative veto in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha4 and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings delegation of signifi-
cant budget-cutting authority to the Comptroller General in
Bowsher v. Synar. II The important distinction between the tradi-
tions is one of emphasis. Neither tradition denies the central
facet of the other. The evolutionary tradition is not blind to the
need for constitutionalism in the working of the American sys-
tem, and the de-evolutionary tradition does not seek to refute
the claim that the nature of society and the shape of the govern-
ment are constantly changing. Evolutionary judges still demand
some limits on how the government deploys its powers, and de-
evolutionary judges often permit the other branches a substan-
tial degree of freedom in construing their own powers. But to
the de-evolutionary judge, the crucial concern in adjudication
under the separation of powers is legitimacy and the need for
constitutional authority. The evolutionary judge is more con-
cerned with the efficiency-perhaps a better term is effective-
ness-of government operation. Thus, although they overlap in
places, the two traditions push quite powerfully in opposite
directions.
The evolutionary tradition emphasizes deference and the
de-evolutionary tradition is relatively intrusive into the affairs of
the other branches; but it would be a mistake to assume that the
de-evolutionary tradition is simply a feature of conservative ac-
tivist jurisprudence, rising to prominence whenever the Supreme
Court is dominated by those who oppose an expansive role for
the federal government in American society. Similarly, the evo-
3. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref.
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
4. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
5. 106 S.Ct. 3181 (1986).
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lutionary tradition is not merely a liberal effort at re-ordering
the economy and the culture to fit some redistributive model.
The Burger Court handed down such important evolutionary de-
cisions as Nixon v. Administrator of General Services6 and, with
some exceptions, was quite sympathetic to the role of indepen-
dent regulatory agencies.7 The Warren Court, on the other hand,
was responsible for Powell v. McCormack,s surely one of the
most perplexing de-evolutionary decisions since the New Deal.
In straining to protect a "right to travel" in Kent v. Dulles,9 the
Warren Court indulged an essentially de-evolutionary gloss on
the non-delegation doctrine to limit the flow of authority from
the legislative branch to the executive.
Neither the evolutionary nor the de-evolutionary tradition
in the separation of powers represents a pure tradition in judi-
cial reasoning. The Court has rarely been consistent, even over
the short term, in choosing one tradition rather than the other
to govern its constitutional analysis. Consequently, neither tra-
dition is easily identified with the direction in which the Court
wants the society to move. Indeed, because the same Justices are
capable of equally forceful arguments in both traditions, the
opinions embodying the arguments generally seem justifications
for results reached, rather than explanations of the analytical
pathways that led the Justices to their conclusions. lO In short,
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the separation of powers'
is as lacking in analytical coherence and clear direction as any
other line of its decisions.
Nevertheless, the distinction between the traditions is quite
useful in developing a theory of the role that the Court should
be playing in resolving challenges to the manner in which the
federal government has decided to distribute its authority.
Neither tradition is wholly satisfactory in melding the needs of
the modern activist state with the limitations inherent in the no-
tion of a written constitution, and the choice of either one will.
lead to difficulties and disappointments. I shall argue, however,
6. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
7. The Burger Court, in fact, made substantial deference to agency rulemaking the
hallmark of federal court review. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
8. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
9. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
10. See W. MURPHY, THE VICAR OF CHRIST 174 (paper ed. 1979) (narrative by ficti-
tious Supreme Court Justice C. Bradley Walker, ill).
HeinOnline -- 1987 BYU L. Rev. 722 1987
722 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1987
that liberal democratic theory demands clear sources of author-
ity to guide adjudication under the structural clauses of the
Constitution, and that the only way in which the courts can dis-
cover those clear sources is to use interpretive tools that render
those clauses relatively determinate. If the structural clauses are
essentially indeterminate-if no narrowing rules limit judicial
interpretive freedom-then the source of authority is more diffi-
cult to discern. As a consequence, the case for the de-evolution-
ary tradition, because of its emphasis on the need for authority,
is stronger than the case for the evolutionary tradition. The de-
evolutionary tradition, moreover, provides a link between the
process of constitutional interpretation on the one hand and, on
the other, a facet of political experience too often ignored or
trivialized by legal theorists: a shared sense of continuity in na-
tionhood. When adjudicating cases arising under the constitu-
tional provisions that establish the system of balanced and sepa-
rated powers, constitutional courts that see a link between the
authoritativeness of their pronouncements and the legitimacy of
their function ought to prefer a slightly softened version of de-
evolutionary tradition.
It may be that extreme societal need would justify setting
the de-evolutionary tradition aside in particular cases, but be-
cause establishing clear rules to determine those cases is so diffi-
cult, the courts should hesitate to try. This does not mean, how-
ever, that the federal government will be strictly limited in its
power and scope to the narrow conception shared among the
Framers in 1787. The de-evolutionary tradition suggests guide-
posts, but will not yield in every case a determinate answer.
Where the answers are unclear, the de-evolutionary judge should
resort to a device that does not always fit comfortably into the
de-evolutionary tradition: The political question doctrine. This
doctrine is a vital tool in adjudicating separation of powers
cases, and needs a revival if the jurisprudence is to be made
coherent.
II. THE TRADITIONS OF SEPARATED POWERS
A. The Evolutionary Tradition
"No single idea," writes Robert Nisbet, "has been more im-
portant than, perhaps as important as, the idea of progress in
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Western civilization for nearly three thousand years."ll Human-
ity, in this vision, has been striving since the first to improve
itself and its condition, and this striving has been successful in
the past and will succeed in the future. The work of the major
figures in the development of liberal democratic theory sparkles
with this vision of human progress.12 The American Revolution
might have been driven in part by the same notion: "The great-
est of the Founding Fathers," Professor Nisbet tells us, and with
reason, "were emphatic in their conviction of past progress over
vast lengths of time for humanity, and of progress, with America
in the vanguard, through a long future. "l3
There has always been a degree of tension between the de-
sire of citizens to move forward and the concept of law. Law, in
most of human experience, has been a device that sets in place
some particular understanding of the way things ought to work,
and while the law is always mutable, it is rarely mutable with
ease.14 Yet America is in a sense a nation of positivists, one in
which political dialogue is concerned far less frequently with the
demands of morality than it is with the commands of law.II; Be-
cause we as a nation rest so much of our public morality on a
supposed rule of law, those who would change the way we live
must first get the law on their side. Since Tocqueville's famous
dictum,16 it has become something of a commonplace that in
11. R. NISBET, HISTORY OF THE !DEA OF PROGRESS 4 (1980).
12. The early liberal theorists "were attached to other specific ends, to which liberty
was a means-essentially peace, prosperity through economic growth, and intellectual
progress." R. SMITH, LmERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15 (1985).
13. R. NISBET, supra note 11, at 194.
14. Samuel Huntington has suggested that the central tension in American public
life stems from frustration with political institutions, which are seen as resistant to the
changes that the public demands as society grows towards its ideal vision of itself. See S.
HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 10-12 (1981). The other
side of the story is that without the concerted action by others, it is quite difficult to
make immutable rules, even rules to govern one's own conduct, and certain rules to gov-
ern the conduct of others. Cf. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J.L. ECON. & GRG.
357 (1985) (rules for self); Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON.
& GRG. 5 (1985) (rules for others).
15. This often misunderstood facet of American life, combined with the near failure
of public moral dialogue in resolving any issue, has the ironic effect that those deter-
mined to change society through the route that American ideology suggests is most legit-
imate-through the legal process-are consistently (and irrelevantly) charged with seek-
ing to impose their moral judgments on others.
16. Wrote Tocqueville: "There is hardly a political question on the United States
which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one." A. De Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 270 (G. Lawrence trans. 1969). It is sometimes forgotten that Tocqueville
made this comment in the course of expressing his admiration for the role of American
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America, the courts are the forum of first resort for individuals
or groups who would prefer that the government not treat them
as it has.17 Given the evidently open-ended nature of the consti-
tutional clauses most directly concerned with matters of funda-
mental right, and the magnificent triumphs of the traditional
civil rights movement using those clauses as their weapons,18
this trend is what an observer would expect. What may be less
apparent is that the clauses concerning the structure of the fed-
eral government are also increasingly pressed into the service of
this vision of societal progress. It is this same sense that human-
ity must and will change and move forward that motivates the
evolutionary tradition.
The evolutionary tradition in separation of powers jurispru-
dence is faithful to the credo that Chief Justice Marshall laid
down by way of explaining, in McCulloch v. Maryland,19 why
the Congress possessed adequate authority to create a Bank of
the United States:
The subject is the execution of those great powers on
which the welfare of a nation essentially depends. It must have
been the intention of those who gave these powers, to insure, as
lawyers. ct. id. at 266 ("I hardly believe that nowadays a republic can hope to survive
unless the lawyers' influence over its affairs grows in proportion to the power of the
people.")
17. Thus ~ocquevillenoted that because of the degree of respect enjoyed by law on
the United States, "those who would like to attach the laws are forced to adopt ostensi-
bly one of two courses: they must either change the nation's opinion or trample its
wishes under foot." Id. at 240. For a passionately polemical, if also witty and sometimes
forceful, critique of the explosion of constitutional claims, see R MORGAN, DISABLING
AMERICA: THE "RIGHTS INDUSTRY" IN OUR TIME (1984). But even if transformation of
moral into legal argument is a depressingly ubiquitous feature of American political and
moral dialogue, it may not be an avoidable one:
Cutting quite across cultural lines, it appears that whenever two persons
come into a conflict that they cannot themselves solve, one solution appealing
to common sense is to call upon a third for assistance in achieving a resolution.
So universal across both time and space is this simple social invention of triads
that we can discover almost no society that fails to employ it. And from its
overwhelming appeal to common sense stems the basic political legitimacy of
courts everywhere. In short, the triad for purposes of conflict resolution is the
basic social logic of courts, a logic so compelling that courts have become a
universal political phenomenon.
M SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLmCAL ANALYSIS 1 (1981). This potential
inevitability says nothing, of course, about the ability of a society to exclude issues from
judicial decision. The interesting question is whether those societies that have not per-
mitted courts to rule on constitutional questions are moving in our direction-or whether
we are moving in theirs.
18. See generally R KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
19. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution.
This could not be done by confiding the choice of means to
such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress
to adopt any which might be appropriate, and which were con-
ducive to the end. This provision is made in a constitution in-
tended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs. . . . To have
declared that the best means shall not be used, but those alone
without which the power given would be nugatory, would have
been to deprive the legislature of the capacity to avail itself of
experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legis-
lation to circumstances. If we apply this principle of construc-
tion to any of the powers of the government, we shall find it so
pernicious in its operation that we shall be compelled to dis-
card it.20
The problems of the nation change, the Chief Justice seemed to
be saying. The Congress must be free to adapt its authority to
meet these fresh problems, "to accommodate its legislation to
circumstance." And when the Congress has made its choice, has
adapted its authority to meet the fresh crisis-so the language
implies-a reviewing court should defer to the congressional
judgment. Thus the evolutionary tradition rests on a principle of
judicial restraint. It is not the Court that brings about evolution
in the separation of powers, but the historical forces to which
the Congress responds. The Court, recognizing this reality and
accepting the need for effective government, permits the Con-
gress to meet the fresh challenges through creation of the insti-
tutions and mechanisms it prefers.
Although McCulloch was the most explicit early statement
of the rationale for the evolutionary tradition, it is by no means
the earliest case that might be set in the tradition. That distinc-
tion might belong to the Court's tantalizing 1798 decision in
Hollingsworth v. Virginia.21 In Hollingsworth the Court rejected
a claim that the eleventh amendment, because it was never
presented to the President for signature after passing both
Houses of the Congress, was illegally sent on to the states for
ratification, and should therefore be considered void. The Court
dismissed this contention, despite an apparently unambiguous
constitutional requirement for presentment.22 Hollingsworth is
20. Id. at 415-16.
21. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
22. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, d. 3 ("Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the
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not much like McCulloch because the Court's opinion did not
contain any language concerning a deference to congressional
judgments-its rejection of the claim occupied but a single sen-
tence in a footnote23-and in fact, the Justices showed no sign of
appreciating their evolutionary feat. Yet the feat, though subtle,
is there: By sustaining this circumvention of the President, the
Justices effectively permitted the Congress to transform a check
on the legislative branch (the need to present proposed amend-
ments to the President before they went to the states) into a
check on the President (the ability of the Congress and the
states to bypass him in the amendment process).24 Even though
perhaps unintended, the mutability that the law demonstrated
in Hollingsworth is possessed of an evolutionary flavor.
The influence of this evolutionary tradition is evident in the
nineteenth century expansion of the powers of the Congress.
Again and again, the Supreme Court ratified congressional judg-
ments on what instrumentalities were required for the effective
deployment of federal authority. The decision in McCulloch is in
a sense the parent of them all, but the tradition, once it started
moving, rapidly gathered steam. Examples abound. McCulloch
ruled that the Congress could establish a bank if it thought one
needed. In 1858, the Justices ruled that the Congress could, in
an exercise of its war-making power, establish courts martial in-
dependent of the judicial branch.215 If railways were needed, the
Congress could establish corporations to lay track and build
bridges, while rendering those corporations immune from state
taxation.26 If the national debt was too costly to repay, the Con-
gress could cause inflation to reduce the value of its obliga-
tions.27 And, in probably the only decision in this line that is
troubling to modern proponents of broad congressional author-
ity, if the Congress concluded that the decisions of the Supreme
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary. . . shall be
presented to the President ....").
23. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 381.
24. "The Court did not suggest that the question of the President's role in the
amendment process was one for the political departments rather than the Court." Dellin-
ger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97
HARv. L. REV. 386, 403 (1983). I am indebted to Charles Black for first pointing out to me
the paradoxical aspect of the Court's conclusion in Hollingsworth.
25. See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 67 (1858).
26. See Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 530 (1894); California v.
Central Pac. R.R., 127 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1888).
27. See Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 303-06 (1935); Knox v. Lee, 79
U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 547-54 (1871).
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Court threatened declared legislative policy, it could curtail the
Court's jurisdiction.28
There were notable exceptions to this trend-Hylton v.
United States is one,29 Paul v. Virginia another/o and Pollock v.
Farmer's Loan & Trust a third31-but these exceptions tended
to involve objections to the subjects the Congress chose for regu-
lation, not the agencies the Congress established in order to reg-
ulate. United States v. Klein32 was the closest to a genuinely de-
evolutionary decision on congressional authority. In Klein, the
Justices refused to permit the Congress to alter the significance
that the Court had already determined presidential pardons to
possess. Klein cannot easily be explained on evolutionary
grounds, but it was at most a small deviation from a plainly evo-
lutionary trend.
The modern American state would be quite different had
the evolutionary tradition not dominated the separation of pow-
ers jurisprudence well into the twentieth century. Without a
doctrine of this kind, there would be no independent regulatory
agencies in the federal government. Absent an evolutionary tra-
dition of deference, the Justices would never have been able to
decide in Humphrey's Executor v. United States33 that the
Congress can create an independent agency, part court, part leg-
islature-in that particular case, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion-that "cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an
arm or an eye of the executive."34 Because the Congress had es-
tablished the agency outside of the executive branch, the Jus-
28. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-14 (1869). A century later,
Justice Douglas cautioned in dissent that U[t]here is a serious question whether the Mc-
Cardle case could command a majority view today." Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530, 605 n.ll (1962). Some contemporary constitutional theories rely on the jurisdiction-
limiting power as an important restriction on an otherwise free-wheeling judicial review.
See, e.g., C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981); M. PERRY, THE COURTS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). Much more contemporary scholarship is skep-
tical or dismissive. See, e.g., Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the
Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.D.L. REV. 205, 258 (1985); Ratner, Majoritarian
Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction,
27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982); Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitu-
tional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 95 HARv. L. REV. 17 (1981).
29. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
30. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
31. 157 U.S. 429, vacated, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
32. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
33. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
34. Id. at 628.
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tices explained, the Commissioners did not serve at the pleasure
of the President.35 And what was the constitutional warrant for
the establishment of an agency that acts, in the Court's words,
"in part quasi-legislatively and in part quasi-judicially"?38 Sim-
ply this: The Congress determined that the agency was needed,
and the congressional authority to establish agencies indepen-
dent of presidential control "cannot be well doubted."37
This is deference with a vengeance, but a deference that is
not difficult to understand. Already in 1935 when Humphrey's
Executor was decided, the Congress had established perhaps
half a dozen independent regulatory commissions that were not
quite part of the legislature and not quite part of the execu-
tive.3s Before the start of the New Deal, a fledgling administra-
tive government was in place, and the decisions and rules of the
administrative agencies had become a part of the national eco-
nomic culture.39 The Court had in the past reviewed cases in-
volving these agencies without ever questioning their legiti-
macy.40 Only an enormously confident Supreme Court would
readily challenge what had become a common part of the
government.
But that is not quite a sufficient explanation for the out-
come, given that the same Supreme Court was at the time en-
gaged in a decidedly de-evolutionary assault on the New Deal.
Constitutional law professors are fond of teasing their students
by reminding them that the Court's decision in Schechter Poul-
try Corp. v. United States41 was in fact handed down on the
same day as Humphrey's Executor. This does present a chal-
lenging conundrum: How can the de-evolutionary doctrine
against delegation of legislative powers, which the Justices ap-
plied in Schechter Poultry, be reconciled with the evolutionary
tradition of deference at work in Humphrey's Executor? The
35. [d. at 629.
36. [d. at 628.
37. [d. at 629.
38. Professor Corwin lists the following independent agencies as of 1935: the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (established in 1887), the Federal Trade Commission
(1914), the Federal Tariff Commission (1916), the Federal Power Commission (1920), the
Federal Communications Commission (1934), and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (1934). E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 90 (4th ed. 1957).
39. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 1197-1242.
40. See id. at 1229-36 (arguing that the Supreme Court generally played the role of
facilitator, not opponent, of Progressive Era regulation).
41. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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best answer is the obvious one, that the Justices were not guided
in either case by the legal philosophy reflected in their opinions.
Instead, they seized both cases as chances to strike at the New
Deal.42 Schechter rejected the National Industrial Recovery Act
of 1933, which, in its early life, had been a popular cornerstone
of the New Deal program. The commissioner, whose challenged
ouster led to Humphrey's Executor, was being removed by Pres-
ident Roosevelt because he was considered unsympathetic to the
aims of the New Deal.43 The cases are linked, in other words, not
by the styles of their reasoning, but by the perceived virtues of
their results: The New Deal had to be stopped.
The New Deal was not stopped, of course, and in retrospect
the New Deal cases represent no more than a minor tremor on
the constitutional landscape. Mter the "switch in time" that
mayor may not have "saved nine,"44 a majority of the Justices
retreated once more into the evolutionary tradition that permit-
ted administrative government to continue to grow.4l> Nine years
after Schechter, the Court in Yakus v. United States46 essen-
tially eviscerated the non-delegation doctrine that had once
threatened bureaucratic government, and since that time, a ma-
42. This traditional explanation-that the Justices were engaged in no more than
standardless Roosevelt-bashing-has been forcefully challenged by my colleague Jerry
Mashaw, who has suggested that the decisions are readily harmonized through a sophis-
ticated vision of courts protecting a federalist republic from the co-opting of its regula-
tory institutions by powerful private interests. While I am unsure which explanation, in
the absence of psychological evidence, is dictated by application of Occam's razor, the
theory Professor Mashaw suggests is an eminently plausible one.
43. See C. PRITCHETr, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 247 (3d ed. 1977); E. CORWIN,
supra note 38, at 9l.
44. This phrase is a reference to the Supreme Court's apparent retreat from its anti-
regulatory stance in the face of President Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" plan. See gener-
ally R JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941). For a suggestion that
Justice Roberts, the swing vote in the repudiation of the judicial assault on the New
Deal, was not in fact intimidated by the Roosevelt proposal, see Frankfurter, Mr. Justice
Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (1955). Naturally, the fact (if it is a fact) that Justice
Roberts altered his position prior to the proposal to alter the size of the Supreme Court
does not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that the public outrage occasioned by the
Court's anti-New Deal jurisprudence was irrelevant to his decision.
45. The immediate result of the "switch" was the Court's decision in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), which dramatically broadened the discretion
of the Congress to use its interstate commerce power to regulate activities formerly con-
sidered too local or too indirectly connected to commerce among the states. This, too,
was an evolutionary development. See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
46. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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jority has never again embraced that theory as a basis for declar-
ing an act of the Congress unconstitutional.'''
The evolutionary tradition has also been at work in the de-
velopment of the relationship between the Congress and the
Court itself. Although it is no easy matter to find an argument
from the constitutional text or its history to support the con-
gressional grant of jurisdiction to federal courts in cases seeking
nothing but a declaratory judgment, the Justices sustained that
grant.48 In the 1960s, nothing but an evolutionary approach to
constitutional analysis could adequately explain the decision in
Katzenbach v. Morgan,49 which sustained congressionallegisla-
tion outlawing as a violation of the fourteenth amendment a
form of literacy test for voting that the Court had ruled just six
years earlier did not violate the amendment's strictures.liO The
Morgan opinion in particular emphasized what McCulloch had,
the need to defer to the congressional judgment on necessity,
even though Morgan involved what appeared to be a direct chal-
lenge to the finality of the Court's constitutional inter-
pretation.lil
Even though recent years have seen a revival of the rhetoric
of the de-evolutionary tradition, both in what the Court has ac-
tually doneli2 and in what dissenters, notably Justice (now Chief
Justice) William Rehnquist, thought it should have done,li3 it is
the evolutionary tradition which is responsible for the growth in
the power and authority of the federal government. And it is
47. In National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974), the
Justices used the non-delegation doctrine as a tool for statutory construction, reading
the statute to avoid finding a broad delegation. Although the Court has not recently
invalidated legislation on non-delegation grounds, some commentators have recom-
mended a revival. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-34 (1980); T. LOWI, THE END
OF LmERALISM 297-98 (1969). So have some Justices. See infra note 53 and accompanying
text. For an important contrasting view, see Mashaw, Pro-Delegation: Why Administra-
tors Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
48. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
49. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
50. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
51. See Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitu-
tional Decisions, 53 U. CHL L. REV. 819 (1986).
52. Commentators have decried this trend as a return to formalism. See, e.g., Elli-
ott, INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution, and the Legis-
lative Veto, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 125; Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Sep-
aration of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 625-40 (1984).
53. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981) (Rehn-
quist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petro-
leum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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that tradition, now apparently threatened, that many contempo-
rary students of the separation of powers are rushing to pre-
serve. On the evolutionary view, for example, the Supreme Court
was wrong to decide in Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Chadha ll" that the legislative veto, because it violates the arti-
cle I requirement that legislation be presented to the President
for signature or veto,1l1l is generally an unconstitutional usurpa-
tion of executive authority. My colleague, E. Donald Elliott
(from whose work I borrow the term "evolutionary tradition,"
although I use the term somewhat differently than he doesll6),
has criticized the Court's failure in Chadha to come to grips
with the reality of the administrative state.1l7 The "threat to the
essence of the constitutional principle of separation of powers"
with which the Court should have been concerned, he argues, is
not the possibility that the Congress has stepped into the wrong
legal category in the form of its acts, but rather
the reality that most of the federal law affecting most of the
people most of the time is not made through the bicameral leg-
islative process that the Court's opinion en~hrines, but by ad-
ministrative decisionmakers, who are not elected and who are
not, by and large, subject to either effective presidential or ju-
dicial control.llS
This point is not, as it may appear to be, a de-evolutionary argu-
ment against the rise of the administrative state. It is instead
firmly in the evolutionary tradition of separation of powers anal-
ysis: Because of the rise of the administrative state-a develop-
ment which, Professor Elliott insists, has so far confounded the
Courtll9-the Justices should show greater deference to congres-
sional strategies to provide some form of continuing political
guidance to the bureaucrats who make so many of our laws.60
No doubt the forthcoming academic criticisms of Bowsher v.
54. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
55. In an earlier era, the Court disregarded the Clause, perhaps in evolutionary zeal.
See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
56. See Elliott, supra note 1. We use the term in subtly different ways, because
Professor Elliott has in mind a jurisprudential tradition, a faith in the ability of law to
evolve on the model of an organism, whereas I am referring to a conscious judicial deci-
sion to permit the law to evolve in order to enable the creation of institutions not con-
templated when the law was laid down.
57. Elliott, supra note 52, at 164.
58. [d. at 146.
59. See id. at 166-68.
60. See id. at 162-76.
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Synar,61 in which the Justices ruled that the Congress may not
vest ultimate budget-cutting authority in the Comptroller Gen-
eral, because he is removable by congressional vote, will be
couched in similar terms. In the meanwhile, Justice White, in
his rigorously evolutionary dissent, has shown the way:
The majority's . . . 'conclusion rests on the rigid dogma that,
outside of the impeachment process, any "direct congressional
role in the removal of officers charged with the execution of the
laws ... is inconsistent with the separation of powers." Reli-
ance on such an unyielding principle to strike down a statute
posing no real danger of aggrandizement of congressional
power is extremely misguided and insensitive to our constitu-
tional role. The wisdom of vesting "executive" powers in an of-
ficer removable by joint resolution may indeed be debata-
ble-as may be the wisdom of the entire scheme of permitting
an unelected official to revise the budget enacted by Con-
gress-but such matters are for the most part to be worked out
between the Congress and the President through the legislative
process, which affords each branch ample opportunity to de-
fend its interests. . . . [T]he role of this Court should be lim-
ited to determining whether the Act so alters the balance of
authority among the branches of government as to pose a gen-
uine threat to the basic division between the lawmaking power
and the power to execute the law.... I see no such threat
62
The important constitutional question, in Justice White's view,
was not whether as a formal matter the powers involved were
"executive" and the officer exercising them was "legislative,"
and his argument had little to do with constitutional history; his
concern was whether in practical effect the statutory scheme al-
tered "the balance of authority" between the President and the
Congress. If, as he concluded, it did not, then the only remaining
question was the wisdom or unwisdom of the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings arrangement, a policy matter which the political
branches had already resolved.
Professor Elliott's critique of the Court's reasoning in
Chadha and Justice White's of the decision in Synar have in
common the general notion that the Congress must be permitted
to act creatively to adapt to a changing reality. This approach
lays the foundation for the evolutionary tradition. The reasoning
61. 106 S.Ct. 3181 (1986).
62. [d. at 3214-15 (White, J., dissenting).
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for the deference that the evolutionary tradition requires is bot-
tomed on the perception that the needs of the nation and the
requisites of the government do change, and no matter what a
Framer might intend or a Court might rule, in the nature of
politics, the government will change too. This, surely, is what
Justice Jackson had in mind when, even as he concurred in the
Court's essentially de-evolutionary decision in Youngstown
Sheet-Tube Co. v. Sawyer63 (popularly known as The Steel
Seizure Case), he warned of impending tragedy if the Congress
did not take note of the ways in which the necessities of govern-
ment were evolving around it. Justice Jackson explicitly ac-
cepted the majority's de-evolutionary premises, but he also set
forth his doubts:
I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep
power in the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in
meeting its problems. A crisis that challenges the President
equally, or perhaps primarily, challenges Congress. If not good
law, there was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Na-
poleon that "The tools belong to the man who can use them."
We may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in
the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent
power from slipping through its fingers. . .. With all its de-
fects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no tech-
nique for long preserving free government except that the Ex-
ecutive be under the law, and that the law be made by
parliamentary deliberations. Such institutions may be destined
to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not
first, to give them Up.6'
So the Court might order the President not to act because its
reading of the Constitution holds that only the Congress can do
what the President is trying to do, but if popular demands on
the government reach such a pitch that somebody has to act,
then sooner or later, somebody will, and given time, so Justice
Jackson seems to suggest, even the Court will accommodate it-
self to the fresh reality. Justice Jackson's opinion is in this sense
like Galileo's recantation: Forced to declare that the separation
of powers stands still, he ends by muttering audibly, "Neverthe-
less, it moves."65
63. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
64. Id. at 654-55 (Jackson, J., concurring).
65. That Galileo muttered these words at the end of his trial is a part of popular
mythology, although it is unclear whether the myth possesses a basis in fact. See G.
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The pure evolutionary judge would not of course have re-
canted in the first place. The separation of powers moves be-
cause the nation moves, and the Court has to let them both go
when the moment arrives. Thus, the evolutionary judge might
argue that Steel Seizure was wrongly decided because the Presi-
dent was responding to the clear need (if there was a clear need)
to get steel production going again.66 Popular impatience with
the pace of the legislative process, so the evolutionary judge
could reason, had led to an accretion of authority in the presi-
dency when rapid action, as against the establishment of long-
range policy, was necessary. The President's exercise of that
power in a particular case would thus be no usurpation, but
rather the only responsible course. This was what Chief Justice
Vinson intended to convey when he wrote in a stinging dissent:
"Executive inaction in [this] situation, courting national disas-
ter, is foreign to the concept of energy and initiative in the Exec-
utive as created by the Founding Fathers."67 The President
must be able to invoke his "broad executive power granted by
article II to an officer on duty 365 days a year" when the Con-
gress cannot act quickly and the action is necessary "to avert
disaster."68
In fact, an evolutionary judge could join the Steel Seizure
majority only in one circumstance: If the judge were convinced
that the Congress had already accommodated its statutory de-
sign to meet the emergency that the President insisted de-
manded his immediate action. This was precisely the point
pressed by Justice Frankfurter, who argued in his concurring
opinion that through the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act,
which provided for the means through which a labor dispute
might be controlled, the "Congress has expressed its will to
withhold this power from the President as though it had said so
in so many words."69 He added to this one of the clearest evolu-
tionary statements ever written by a Supreme Court Jus-
tice-albeit one which, he concluded, did not apply to the case
before the Court:
The Constitution is a framework for government. There-
fore the way the framework has consistently operated fairly es-
DESANTILLANA, THE CRIME OF GALILEO 238 (1955).
66. See E. CORWIN, supra note 38, at 154-57.
67. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 703 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 708.
69. Id. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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tablishes that it has operated according to its true nature.
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government
cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give
meaning to the words of a text or supply them. It is an inad-
missibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to
confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the
gloss which life has written upon them. In short, a systematic,
unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presi-
dents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making
as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our
government, may be treated as a gloss on the "executive
Power" vested in the President ....70
In other words, it moves. Nevertheless, it moves.
B. The De-Evolutionary Tradition
Rapidly increasing complexity in most fields of human en-
deavor is met sooner or later by a neo-romantic yearning for a
lost Golden Age, a time when matters were both simpler and
better.71 This is particularly true in the United States, where, as
J.G.A. Pocock has pointed out, to a "curious extent ... the
most post-modern and post-industrial of societies continues to
venerate pre-modern and anti-industrial values, symbols, and
constitutional forms ...."72 Our cultural mythology, Professor
Pocock suggests, arises "out of the attempt to escape history and
then regenerate it. "73 Thus, it was perhaps inevitable that the
social and economic revolution sparked by the federal govern-
ment's phenomenal growth in size, power, and intrusiveness dur-
ing the first century and a half of rule under the Constitution
would in its turn spawn a counter-revolution, seeking to slow the
clock or even to turn it back, in order to return not so much to
the way things used to be as to the way we would like to believe
they used to be. The de-evolutionary rhetoric which marked the
immediate judicial reaction to the New Deal was in a sense the
70. [d. at 610·11.
71. This yearning for a simpler age is particularly common as people react to a rap-
idly changing technological world. For discussions of this yearning, see, e.g., S. FLORMAN,
BLAMING TECHNOLOGY: THE IRRATIONAL SEARCH FOR SCAPEGOATS (1981); Marx, Reflec-
tions on the Neo-Romantic Critique of Science, in LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 61 (G.
Holton & R. Morrison eds. 1979).
72. J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 549 (1975).
73. [d. at 545.
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legal arm of this counter-revolution; the de-evolutionary trend in
recent Supreme Court decisions and in contemporary political
polemic is quite likely the reflection of something similar.
The underlying principle of this de-evolutionary tradition is
captured in the much-ridiculed (and perhaps misunderstood)
statement by Oliver Wendell Holmes in New York Trust Co. v.
Eisner7• that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic."76
Justice Holmes was writing about taxes, not about constitutional
interpretation as such, but his statement was rigorously de-evo-
lutionary nevertheless.76 When adopted as a credo by the de-ev-
olutionist, the statement has nothing to do with judicial unwill-
ingness or inability to follow logical argument; rather, it has to
do with the sources of authority in resolving cases arising under
the system of balanced and separated powers. "A volume of
logic" is not sufficient evidence of meaning because reasoning
alone is not, in de-evolutionary theory, an adequately authorita-
tive basis for decision. The text might be enough, but only inso-
far as it suggests the governmental form envisioned by its au-
thors. The views of the authors themselves are ideal: "Tell me
what the Framers said," the de-evolutionary judge demands,
"and then I'll tell you what the test means."
A good example of the de-evolutionary judge's dismissal of
arguments over public policy when, in the judge's view, the vi-
sion of the Framers is easily discerned, arose in the Court's opin-
ion in Buckley v. Valeo.77 There the Justices rejected efforts by
the Congress to bypass the President in appointing members of
the Federal Elections Commission. The policy considerations in
defense of the appointment provisions were plain enough: The
entire lesson of Watergate (a scandal the breadth and depth of
which is too often forgotten7S) was surely that no President can
74. 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
75. [d. at 349.
76. Eisner involved a challenge to a particular tax levy as an impermissible "direct"
tax. In concluding that the tax was instead an "excise" tax, the Justices explained that
what mattered was whether the tax had been levied as an excise tax over the years-not
whether, as a matter of simple logic, it was the functional equivalent of a direct tax. It
was on this point that Justice Holmes concluded that history was more important than
logic. Obviously, an opinion of this nature is de-evolutionary in spirit.
77. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
78. Those needing a reminder, those too young to recall, or those who persist in
thinking that the liberal news media, which hated him so, hounded President Nixon
from office for no good reason, might profitably peruse NEW YORK TIMES, THE END OF A
PRESIDENCY (1974), the excellent chronology and catalogue of Nixon Administration mis-
deeds produced by the Times' editorial staff shortly after President Nixon's resignation.
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be trusted to monitor himself. Were the President to appoint
the members of the Commission that would be charged with in-
vestigating his own campaign, then there would be no particular
reason to trust the investigators. In other words, the entire
scheme of federal regulation of campaign contributions and ex-
penditures-a response to an obvious necessity-might fail if
the constitutional guidelines on appointment were read too
literally.79
The Court's per curiam opinion gave little sympathy.
"[S]uch fears," the Court replied, "however rational, do not by
themselves warrant a distortion of the Framers' work."80 The
constitutional system of checks and balances, on this view, is a
finished product, almost a work of art, and worth preserving not
because of its quality-the goodness or badness of "the Framers'
work" is decidedly not the issue-but simply because of its an-
tiquity. For the de-evolutionary judge, that antiquity, by provid-
ing a link to the Golden Age, reinforces the legitimacy of the
interpretation that it generates. The same reasoning, only set
forth in greater detail, led to the rejection in Chadha of the
claim that effective government operation required that the
Congress be allowed to retain a veto over the exercise of powers
that it has delegated to the executive branch:
[I]t is crystal clear that the Framers ranked other values
higher than efficiency [They] unmistakabl[y] express[ed]
. . . a determination that legislation by the national Congress
be a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process. The
choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional
Convention impose burdens on governmental processes that
often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard
choices were consciously made by men who had lived under a
form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental
acts to go unchecked. There is no support in the Constitution
or decisions of this Court for the proposition that the cumber-
someness and delays often encountered in complying with ex-
plicit constitutional standards may be avoided, either by the
Congress or by the President.81
The theme is the same: This precious work of the Framers must
79. This potential failure is tempered, of course, by the congressional ability to
make presidential appointments depend on the approval of the Senate.
80. 424 U.S. at 134.
81. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983) (citing Youngstown Sheet-Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952».
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be preserved in the form they wanted it to have. The reasoning
has a private law analogue in the concept of moral right, foreign
to American copyright law but quite common elsewhere, under
which artists, even after selling- their work, retain some control
over what is done with it later, and, in particular, can act to
prevent its distortion or its destruction.s2 The de-evolutionary
judge is acting as proxy for the artists-those who wrote and
ratified the Constitution-to prevent any distortion of their val-
uable work.
The rhetoric of the de-evolutionary tradition sometimes
seems almost religious in the fervor of its veneration of the
Framers.s3 The de-evolutionary judge, as protector and perhaps
oracle of the dead Framers, must guard against dangers much
like those that pass through the mind of Okonkwo, the troubled
protagonist of one of Chinua Achebe's most powerful novels.
Okonkwo, when he sits down to work out the awful conse-
quences for his world of his son's decision to abandon the Ibo
tradition of ancestor worship and become a Christian, concludes
that "[t]o abandon the gods of one's father ... [is] the very
depth of abomination."s4 And there is more:
Suppose when he died all his male children decided to follow
Nwoye's steps and abandon their ancestors? Okonkwo felt a
cold shudder run through him at the terrible prospect, like the
prospect of annihilation. He saw himself and his fathers crowd-
ing round their ancestral shrine waiting in vain for worship and
sacrifice and finding nothing but ashes of bygone days, and his
children the while praying to the white man's god.8~
One can almost see the worried faces of the dead ancestors-or
the dead Framers-wondering who will worship them now that
the world has changed. It is because of this sense of disintegra-
82. See generally R. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION, AND OTHER TOPICS 571-95 (4th ed. 1985); Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral
Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMPo L. 465, 480-86 (1968).
83. In other contexts, a number of scholars have looked for religious analogues to
theories of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Grey, The Constitution as Scripture,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion,
1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123.
84. C. ACHEBE, THINGS FALL APART 158 (1959).
85. Id. A more anthropologically apt analogy might be to the Melanesian "cargo
cults," adherents of which believe that the spirits of their ancestors will return by sea,
bringing treasures-"cargo"-that will suffice to undo what the white man's invasion has
done. The cargo cults, too, in effect yearn for the return of a lost Golden Age, and count
on their ancestors to bring it back. See generally P. WORSLEY, THE TRUMPET SHALL
SOUND: A STUDY OF "CARGO" CULTS IN MELANESIA (2d ed. 1968).
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tion of society in the face of the rejection of traditional author-
ity-a sense plainly shared by de-evolutionary judges-that
Achebe chose to call his fine novel Things Fall Apart.
The de-evolutionist, of course, prefers to hold things to-
gether, and the link between legitimacy and antiquity is a cru-
cial tool. Thus, what matters most in the cases construing the
system of balanced and separated powers is the way that those
who set up the system of balanced and separated powers actu-
ally envisioned its operation. In Chadha, for example, the major-
ity cited the records of the Constitutional Convention in support
of its conclusion that the Congress may retain a legislative veto
over executive action only if that veto complies with the article
II requirements of bicameralism and presentment.88 These con-
stitutional provisions, the Court insisted, represent "the Fram-
ers' decision that the legislative power of the Federal Govern-
ment be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and
exhaustively considered, procedure."87 This faith that the sys-
tem of balanced and separated powers was "exhaustively consid-
ered" is a cornerstone of the de-evolutionary tradition. If there
was no such exhaustive planning, there is nothing to hark back
to.
Similarly, in such decisions as Powell v. McCormack,88
Nixon v. Fitzgerald,89 and, most recently, Bowsher v. Synar,90
the Justices have relied in part on contemporaneous debates
over ratification in determining that the Constitution prohibits,
respectively, congressional refusal to seat a member who meets
the qualifications explicitly set forth in article I, judicial implica-
tion of a right to sue a President for damages based on his offi-
cial conduct, and delegation to a congressional employee of au-
thority that is executive in nature. Chief Justice Burger's
majority opinion in Synar in particular pursues the same theme
of a cautiously worked out system of checks and balances:
That this system of division and separation of powers produces
conflicts, confusion, and discordance at times is inherent, but it
was deliberately so structured to assure full, vigorous and open
debate on the great issues affecting the people and to provide
86. INS V. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-51 (1983).
87. ld. at 951.
88. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
89. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
90. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
HeinOnline -- 1987 BYU L. Rev. 740 1987
740 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1987
avenues for the operation of checks on the exercise of govern-
mental power.91
The neo-romanticism of this tradition, the sense of wise Framers
living and working in a lost Golden Age,92 is plain on the face of
this argument. The need to return to that Golden Age, to give
heed to the wisdom of the Framers, is considered almost so obvi-
ous as to require no analytical support. After all, these wise
Framers must have meant something by the words they chose.93
Thus, for the de-evolutionary judge seeking to resolve a dispute
arising under the separation of powers, nothing is more impor-
tant than gaining an understanding of the way that those who
wrote and ratified the Constitution hoped that the government
structure would operate.
The need to consider the history is, for the de-evolutionary
judge, inextricably bound up with the legitimacy of the judicial
role. In the constitutional system of balanced and separated
powers, the de-evolutionary judge finds the central justification
not only for the work of the courts, but for the very existence of
the government of the United States. The authors of the Consti-
tution, in this vision, battled and compromised throughout the
two months of the Philadelphia Convention in their efforts to
design a system which, as Madison put it in The Federalist No.
51, comprised several "constituent parts" which would, in their
interaction, "be the means of keeping each other in their proper
places," and which was aimed at "divid[ing] and arrang[ing] the
several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on
the other."94 To permit one branch of the government to check
another in a manner inconsistent with this original design, the
de-evolutionary judge holds, is to risk upsetting this carefully
worked out balance. From there, the de-evolutionary argument
91. [d. at 3187.
92. C. Vann Woodward has characterized as the "Golden Age Fallacy" the view that
the Franters of the Constitution were wiser and nobler than people of later generations,
and the invariable consequence of that view, that their public words and actions at the
time of ratification and in the early years of the Republic constitute some catalogue of
what the document must have meant to them. See THE RESPONSES OF THE PRESIDENTS TO
CHARGES OF MISCONDUCT at xiv (C. Woodward ed. 1974). The point of the criticism is
that the wise Franters of the "Golden Age," like politicians of every other age, had spe-
cific policy concerns which were sometimes best addressed by making politically inspired
claims about constitutional requirements or prohibitions.
93. It is possible, of course, to concede that the Franters must have meant some-
thing while denying the possibility of discovering that meaning. See Brest, The Miscon-
ceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980).
94. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 355-56 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
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proceeds almost syllogistically: The government is legitimate
only as long as it operates pursuant to the Constitution's system
of balanced and separated powers. If the balance is disturbed,
then the nation is no longer governed under that Constitution,
and if there is no longer constitutional government, then there is
no longer legitimate government. That is why the history is so
important. And it is this central notion of the link between his-
tory and legitimacy that leads the de-evolutionary judge to the
essentially activist stance of preventing the branches of the fed-
eral government from straying too far beyond the metes and
bounds marked out in the historical record.
The de-evolutionary judge will not always insist on search-
ing through dusty historical tomes (even if word-processed) in
order to gain the necessary understanding. The judge might rely
instead on an apparent "plain meaning" of the text, but will
generally treat the words as a sort of "best evidence" of the in-
tentions of those who wrote them. In the Steel Seizure Case,95
Justice Black's majority opinion rejected President Truman's ar-
gument that an amalgam of several of his executive powers pro-
vided adequate authority to seize and operate the steel mills. Ig-
noring the amalgam argument, the majority considered the
executive powers seriatim, concluding that none was sufficient to
justify the President's action.96 According to Justice Black, the
President was trying to exercise legislative authority.97 The con-
stitutional "framework"-the structure of the text-was cited as
prohibiting what he was trying to do:
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's
power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the
idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his
functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of
laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And
the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall
make laws which the President is to execute.... The Foun-
ders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Con-
gress alone in both good and bad times. It would do no good to
recall the historical events, the fears of power and the hopes
for freedom that lay behind their choice.98
This passage echoes, and not faintly, with Montesquieu's rather
95. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
96. [d. at 585-89.
97. [d. at 582-89.
98. [d. at 587-89.
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dogmatic understanding of the separation of powers. His rule,
expressed in The Spirit of the Laws, was simple and firm:
"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the
same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no
liberty."99 The executive, according to Montesquieu, would
"have a share in the legislature by the power of refusing," that
is, through the exercise of a veto.lOO But "[i]f the prince were to
have a share in the legislature by the power of enacting, liberty
would be lost.mOl
To label Montesquieu the patron saint of the de-evolution-
ary tradition would be unfair, but de-evolutionary judges and
scholars do have a habit of quoting him more frequently than,
say, John Locke, who, despite views on the separation of powers
quite similar to Montesquieu's, might better be cast as an apos-
tle of evolution.l02 The de-evolutionary judge, like Montesquieu
and unlike the Supreme Court in the peculiarly evolutionary
rhetoric it selected in justifying its de-evolutionary decision in
Buckley v. Valeo,103 often treats the powers of the federal gov-
ernment as though there really is a "hermetic seal" separating
the branches from one another.l04 The most important New
Deal separation of powers cases, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryanl015
(often remembered as Hot Oil) and Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United Statesl06 (popularly ridiculed as Sick Chicken), con-
strued the interaction of article I and article II to prohibit a del-
egation by the legislative branch to the executive of an authority
sufficiently broad "as essentially to commit to the President the
functions of a legislature...."107 Obviously, the Court might
have been right or wrong in reading the delegations in those
cases as running afoul of its test.lOB What matters more for pre-
99. 1 M. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk. XI, ch. 6, para. 4 (T. Nugent
trans. rev. ed. 1902) (1st ed. 1750).
100. [d. para. 52.
101. [d. para. 53.
102. Locke, for example, apparently considered it appropriate for the executive to
defy the legislature when the executive's judgment of the public good so required. See
infra note 195. This is far more dynamic than Montesquieu's notion of a static, almost
mechanistic system of checks and balances that are clear and determinate.
103. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
104. See id. at 121.
105. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
106. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
107. 293 U.S. at 418.
108. In Schechter, even Justices Cardozo and Stone, previously and subsequently
staunch New Deal supporters, felt bound to conclude that delegation was "running riot."
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sent purposes is the almost offhand way in which the Court con-
cluded in both cases that a standardless delegation is not per-
missible. Legislation is the thing that the Congress does, and so
ipso facto (as the Justices seemed to think) it cannot be done by
anyone else.l09
Although the de-evolutionary tradition never vanished en-
tirely from the separation of powers jurisprudence,11o it dropped
into a half-century quiescence following the New Deal cases.
True, it briefly opened one eye to assist Justice Black in the
Steel Seizure Case, although even there the concurring opinions
of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson were more in the evolution-
ary spirit.lll But mostly it slumbered. The last few years, how-
ever, have been marked by an almost extraordinary renaissance
in de-evolutionary analysis of separation of powers problems. It
is as though a majority of the Justices has suddenly decided to
cry "Hold, enough!"ll2 Or to move from Shakesperean metaphor
back to Galileo, the mutterings of "Nevertheless, it moves," have
apparently been heard, and the Court has decided to issue a
fresh condemnation of this heresy.
III. THE WEAKNESSES OF THE TRADITIONS
Although the evolutionary and de-evolutionary traditions
seem ascendant almost in neat cycles, both continue to thrive
and to provide intellectual challenge. The twin traditions over-
lap, but at the same time, they pull in opposite directions. Each
has its adherents, among scholars and judges alike, and the ar-
295 U.S. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
109. See id. at 529-42.
110. In particular, the language of de-evolution never vanished from the case law.
For example, when in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Justices overruled
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), which had found unconstitutional a congres-
sional enactment preventing products of child labor from entering interstate commerce,
the Justices cited nothing about the changing needs of society or a fresh construction of
the Constitution. Hammer v. Dagenhart was wrong, the Court concluded, because it mis-
understood the rule that had been in the Constitution all along:
The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for
the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no
restriction and over which the courts are given no control•
. . . Hammer v. Dagenhart was a departure from the principles which
have prevailed in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause both before and
since the decision . ..."
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. at 115-17 (emphasis added).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 64-70.
112. Shakespeare, Tragedy of Macbeth, act 5, scene 8, line 20.
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guments raised in support of each deserve to be taken seriously.
Yet the two traditions that have governed the separation of
powers jurisprudence both raise analytical questions sufficiently
grave as to cast doubt on whether either one, in its pure form,
can supply the courts a relatively coherent analytical approach
for cases involving this system of balanced and separated pow-
ers. I will discuss the problems with each tradition in turn.
A. The Dangers of Evolution
1. The policy problems
In form, the evolutionary tradition avoids considerations of
proper policy, deferring to the judgment of the Congress on how
the needs of the nation ought to be met. In substance, however,
the evolutionary tradition itself reflects three judicial policy
judgments, each one reasonably attractive on the surface (which
helps explain the appeal of the tradition itself) but somewhat
more troubling underneath.
a. Congressional expertise. The first policy judgment should
be clear, stating as it does the central principle on which the
tradition is grounded: The Congress has a better sense than the
courts possibly can have about what institutional forms are
needed in order to meet the challenges of a changing nation.
This judgment must be present; if it isn't, then the case for def-
erence to the congressional judgment on the necessity of these
new institutional forms becomes startlingly weak. In fact, absent
this principle, John Marshall's analysis in McCulloch v. Mary-
land1l3 was exactly backward, for the proper role of the Court
would have been to make an independent determination on
whether the Bank of the United States was necessary or not.
The result might have been the same, but the evolutionary tra-
dition would have missed this vital constitutional launching.
This policy judgment ought to be controversial. After all, as
many political scientists have pointed out, a rule requiring judi-
cial deference to legislative decisions is fraught with paradox.
Rules of this kind entail significant costs, both to the ideal of
representative democracy they are said to preserve and to the
hope for rational decisionmaking they are said to promote.ll4
Public choice theory has cast significant doubt on the efficacy of
113. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
114. See RIKER & WEINGAST. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF JUDI-
CIAL DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATURES (unpublished).
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legislative bodies in aggregating private preferences,Ill, and at
the very least, our modern understanding of the weaknesses of
representation has forced a redefinition of the terms of the de-
bate.1l6 If legislatures in fact possess the weaknesses that theory
suggests, one may fairly ask why their members should be pre-
sumed to have a better sense than judges do of the needs of the
nation and the institutional forms required to meet those needs.
The question is not unanswerable. Many of the answers,
however, might come down to a desire to preserve the traditional
understandings of the roles and abilities of the branches almost
for their own sake, which sounds suspiciously de-evolutionary.
Another approach might be to join with John Ely, who has ri-
posted: "[W]e may grant until we're blue in the face that legisla-
tures aren't wholly democratic, but that isn't going to make
courts more democratic than legislatures."ll7 This response
might be beside the point, which is not to join the debate over
whether courts or legislatures are the more democratic (in this
sense, representative and responsive) institutions, but only to
115. The weakness of majority rule is an old story. See e.g., K. ARROW, SOCIAL
CHOICE AND INDMDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); D. BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITI'EES AND
ELECTIONS (1958); A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970). See also J.
BUCHANAN & G. TuLLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962). The theory of pluralism,
which envisions a politic in which competing groups form temporary coalitions around
common interests, see generally R DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956),
may not quite work, see infra note 212, and in any case is not precisely the vision from
classical republicanism that inspired the Framers. Cf. Bessette, Deliberative Democracy:
The Majority Principle in Republican Government, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTI-
TUTION? (R. Goldwin & W. Schambra eds. 1980). See also Sunstein, Legal Interference
with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHL L. REV. 1129 (1986) (suggesting the need for a legal
system capable of distinguishing endogenous from exogenous preferences).
116. Legal theorists defending sophisticated versions of democratic theory now feel
obliged to address the concern about the weaknesses of representation, if only to dismiss
it. See, e.g., R DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 141 (1977) ("it does not so much
undermine the argument from democracy as call for more democracy"); J. ELY, supra
note 47, at 67 ("the appropriate answer is to make [the legislatures] more democratic").
The dominance of interest groups in the legislative process has sparked debate,
sometimes seemingly whimsical, sometimes somewhat bizarre, about the proper role of
the courts in reviewing "interest-group" legislation. See, e.g, Easterbrook, The Supreme
Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REV. 4
(1984) (courts as enforcers of the bargain between the legislature and the interest group);
Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L.
& ECON. 875, 883-92 (1975) (courts as agencies that increase the value of the legislation
sold by the legislature to the interest group); Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legis-
lation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
223 (1986) (courts as agencies to increase the cost of interest group legislation, making its
purchase less attractive).
117. J. ELY, supra note 47, at 67.
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ask whether, if legislatures in fact do not represent people well
and if the rule of deference really does have the costs suggested,
this underlying principle is a sensible one on which to lay the
foundation of separation of powers analysis. I do not insist that
it is not; I only want to remind the reader that the issue is
present.
b. Fresh checks. More important is a second policy judg-
ment that pulls in tandem with the first one. This second princi-
ple, a sine qua non of any evolutionary theory, holds that when
the Congress has determined that a new institutional arrange-
ment is necessary, the fresh congressional judgment in effect su-
persedes the original framework of checks and balances. I say
"supersedes" instead of "overrides" because the sense of the ev-
olutionary tradition is one of successive institutional forms: A
gives way to B gives way to C gives way to D as each earlier
arrangement is found wanting. In particular, new arrangements
for controlling the President in the continuing battle for
supremacy may supersede older institutional forms.
I have elsewhere referred to these new institutional arrange-
ments for controlling the President as "fresh checks."ll8 The no-
tion that congressionally established fresh checks should super-
sede the original system of balanced and separated powers, as a
legislative scheme is put into place over the constitutional one,
raises two difficult policy questions. First, can only the Congress
establish these fresh checks, or can the President or the courts
do so as well?1l9 Perhaps the courts could be blocked by the
claim that they lack the factfinding expertise of the legislature,
but even if this dubious claim is valid,120 the same argument
would fail against the President, for in the "real world" in which
the evolutionary judge prefers to operate, the investigative re-
sources of the Executive Branch dwarf those of the Congress.121
118. See Carter, The Right Questions in the Creation of Constitutional Meaning,
66 B.U.L. REV. 71, 76 (1986) (describing the need for "a constitutional safe harbor," in
part to limit the opportunities for creation of fresh checks).
119. For a discussion of court-created fresh checks, see Carter, The Political As-
pects of Judicial Power: Some Notes on the Presidential Immunity Decision, 131 U. PA.
L. REV. 1341, 1367-84 (1983) (discussing, inter alia, implied rights of action as "fresh
remedies").
120. Courts routinely act to resolve questions presenting special technical or other
fact-finding difficulties, sometimes with the aid of special masters, sometimes without.
Moreover, the courts in theory are more dispassionate factfinders than the more politi-
cally sensitive legislature.
121. A variant of this notion holds that an executive functionary potentially can
exercise investigative and regulatory power in a less overtly political-more profes-
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The second difficult policy question is this one: If the Con-
gress can judge that necessity requires the establishment of
fresh checks as against the President, could it not also decide
that the time had come for fresh checks as against the courts?
An authority to alter jurisdiction, or even to override specific
constitutional decisions, might be deemed by the Congress as
absolutely imperative in order to restore the proper balance of
powers long lost in this era of judicial search for fundamental
rights.122 One might try to mix in the bizarre policy judgment
that an independent judiciary (that is, a judiciary protected by a
de-evolutionary constitutional understanding) is more important
than an independent executive. But the case for this question-
begging principle is difficult to imagine, and in its absence it is
not easy to see how the evolutionary judge can avoid deference
to the Congress even when the issue is control of the courts.
c. Boundaries of discretion. The most fundamental of the
policy judgments that underlie the evolutionary tradition grows
from the role the courts play in society. Whether they defer to
legislative judgments or not, they are still constitutional courts
expected to engage in judicial review, and those who oppose par-
ticular governmental initiatives will continue to come before the
judges in the hope of winning in litigation what was lost in legis-
lation. In general, advocates of the evolutionary tradition do not
want to abandon this role; rather, they want to deal with separa-
tion of powers problems at a different level of abstraction. No
matter whether the Constitution itself or relevant historical
materials disclose an understanding contrary to what the Con-
gress now seeks to do. The question the evolutionary judge asks
herself, much as Justice White did in his stinging dissent in
Synar, is whether the system of checks and balances is "really"
threatened.123 If there are adequate checks still available, if the
powers remain "really" separated, then the inquiry is ended.
sional-manner than can a committee of the Congress, the members of which must stand
for election. This is, of course, a principal justification offered for delegation to the exec-
utive branch of authority that might otherwise be considered legislative in nature. See
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669,
1671-78 (1975) (describing the traditional model of administrative regulation).
122. Some theorists who support a judicial review relatively unconnected to the
Constitution's text or history have argued that a congressional authority to alter the
jurisdiction of the federal courts is an essential majoritarian check on the broad-ranging
protection of rights in which both contend the courts should be engaged. See supra note
28.
123. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S.Ct. 3181 (1986).
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But this approach assumes that even in the absence of a
reliance on the history and text that provide the grist for the de-
evolutionary mill, the evolutionary judge has a means for discov-
ering when the powers are "really" separated and when they are
not. Evolutionary judges and scholars are not always clear on
how they will identify the cases in which the congressional rede-
ployment of authority has gone too far, or even what "too far"
means in such a context as this. Vague references to an effective
ability in the President to check the congressional exercise of its
newly minted power124 cannot possibly be an adequate answer,
because the President would challenge the new institutional
form only if he believed that at least a part of the power in ques-
tion was rightly his. In other words, to refer to the problem as
one of "real" checks is to suggest that only checks and bal-
ances-not the separation of powers itself-are of constitutional
significance. More sophisticated explanations may be offered,
but one may concede that a general theory might exist and still
ponder the wisdom of a policy that leaves so vague the bounda-
ries of congressional authority.
2. The authority problem
The less tractable difficulty with the evolutionary tradition
is the one that leads de-evolutionary judges to suspicion of it.
The problem is this: It is unclear what constitutional warrant
the courts have for permitting the Congress free aggrandizement
of its own authority in the guise of exercising its judgment on
what institutional arrangements new problems require. The dis-
tinction between a government that operates under a written
Constitution and a government that does not is supposed to be
that the written Constitution provides real limits in real cases on
what the government can do, and that mere popularity of a par-
ticular initiative, mere contemporary consensus on some new or-
der, is not sufficient to overcome that rule.
This criticism is more often leveled, many times with much
less reason, against courts involved in tilting at the windmills of
fundamental right.125 In a sense this tendency to treat judicial
decisions as the whole of constitutional law has always been a
curious phenomenon, because if Alexander Bickel was right to
124. Some of the references are more sophisticated. See, e.g., Bruff, Presidential
Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.•J. 451, 488-508 (1979).
125. For a sharp reminder, see Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985).
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identify the federal courts as the least dangerous branch of the
national government,126 the framers surely were equally right in
their fear that the most dangerous was the legislature.127 Unfor-
tunately, consideration of the structural limits on the constitu-
tional authority of the Congress no longer inspires a significant
part of constitutional scholarship.
Unless we are all evolutionists, as once we were all supposed
to be Keynesians,128 the question of congressional authority
should be central for any serious student of the legitimacy of the
American system of government. The evolutionary theorist has
an obligation to explain precisely what facet of constitutional or
democratic theory legitimates a congressional project of rear-
ranging institutional forms to meet that same Congress's essen-
tially unreviewable vision of societal needs; and further, what
portion of theory justifies consistent judicial deference to these
institutional rearrangements.129
A judge who is resisting the lure of de-evolution cannot sim-
ply retreat into the history of drafting and ratification. Instead,
she must look to other, vaguer guides in deciding whether a
proper balance of powers exists or whether the latest congres-
sional initiative must be struck down. Obviously, the judge could
simply trust her own instincts, her own "sight of the board," as
the chessplayers call it,130 to tell her how well the system of
checks and balances will work if the congressional action is sus-
tained. She might consider the views of experts who have stud-
126. See generally A BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR m' POLITICS (1962). Ct. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (making the
same point for propaganda purposes).
127. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 409-25
(1969) (describing fear of "the few" of oppression by "the many" as a driving force in
post-reVOlutionary political science). But ct. G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDER-
ALIST 126-45 (1981) (suggesting that Hamilton's contributions to The Federalist Papers
contemplate legislative supremacy).
128. "By 1969, a conservative President could announce his conversion to Keynesian
principles with little rebuke." T. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY xix (3d ed. 1976).
When President Nixon announced his "conversion," one television commentator-I be-
lieve it was Howard K. Smith-turned to the camera and said something like, "That's a
bit like a Crusader saying Mohammed was right all along."
129. I do not mean to suggest that no theorists have done so. See, e.g., Elliott, supra
note 52.
130. Some judges have a very quick sight of the board, and I assume that like chess
players, the quicker, the better. But chess players act on their sight of the board alone
only when they are in time trouble. The better chess players indulge in rigorous analysis
when time allows-a point that judges should keep in mind.
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ied the problem,131 but then she will risk becoming a prisoner of
the same instrumental rationality, the testing of means only
against their efficacy in achieving stated ends, that has come to
drive so much of the American governmental and intellectual
enterprise.132
There is significant tension between the idea of considering
policies only as means for achieving stated ends and the ideals of
constitutionalism. Instrumental rationality generally takes the
ends, the policy goals, as given, for it accepts the premise of lib-
eral democratic theory and of neoclassical economics that it is
generally inappropriate-and impossible-to analyze the moti-
vations lying behind individual preferences.133 But the means
chosen to implement the goals can be broken up into smaller
components, and by using the tools of modern policy science, the
analyst can subject them to relentless dissection, analysis, and
criticism, before finally proposing paths toward reform.134 The
evolutionary tradition fits this model, for what matters to the
evolutionist is whether a particular arrangement for the exercise
of federal power is the most efficacious one, given the end in
sight. The evolutionary judge's subsidiary inquiry, whether this
efficacious arrangement maintains a "real" balance of powers,
also reduces to a question of the same kind.
The problem with this use of our burgeoning public policy
science, an inevitable one in an area of theory driven by instru-
mental rationality, is that the law itself is stripped of the aura of
uniqueness which is assigned to it in liberal theory. The law be-
comes all too mutable, and is left as no more than one of the
means that must be tested against its efficacy in achieving the
131. Spiro Agnew, while serving as Vice President of the United States, supposedly
said, "You don't learn about poverty from people who are poor, but from experts who
have studied the problem." The analogy to constitutional theory should go without being
stated.
132. Critical treatments of instrumental rationality as a driving force in society in-
clude M. HORKHEIMER, ECLIPSE OF REASON (1947), and R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLI-
TICS (1975).
133. Some theorists might argue, however, that the reasons that preferences are
formed are crucial for democratic government. See generally M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERN-
MENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983) (caution-
ing against government indoctrination); Sunstein, supra note 115 (arguing that only
truly endogenous preferences should be the basis for government decisions). Cf. H. MAR-
CUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 208 (1964) ("the repression of society in the formation of
concepts is tantamount to an academic confinement of experience, a restriction of
meaning").
134. See, e.g., Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The
Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1973).
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desired end.1311 The Constitution, which is after all a species of
law,138 is thus quite naturally viewed as a potential impediment
to policy, a barrier that must be adjusted, through interpretation
or amendment, more often than preservation of government
under that Constitution is viewed as a desirable policy in it-
self.137 In this the modern student of policy is like the modern
moral philosopher-and like a good number of constitutional
theorists as well-in denigrating the value of preserving any par-
ticular process and exalting the desirable result.138 But constitu-
tionalism assigns enormous importance to process, and conse-
quently assigns costs, albeit perhaps intangible ones, to violating
the constitutional process. For the constitutionalist, as for classi-
cal liberal democratic theory, the autonomy of the people them-
selves, not the achievement of some well-intentioned govern-
ment policy, is the ultimate end for which the government
exists. As a consequence, no violation of the means the people
have approved for pursuit of policy-here, the means embodied
in the structural provisions of the Constitution-can be justified
through reference to the policy itself as the end.139
Somewhere between the totalitarian horror of a society
135. "[P]olicy-oriented legal discourse forces one to make explicit choices among
values, and the pursuit of procedural or substantive justice requires that rules be inter-
preted in terms of ideals that define the conception of justice." R UNGER, LAW IN MOD-
ERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 195 (1976).
136. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), the understanding that
the Constitution is a kind of law was crucial to Chief Justice Marshall's analysis, which
justified judicial review essentially by treating it as a choice of law problem. Should the
two laws conflict, Chief Justice Marshall explained, the judicial task is to decide which
one governs. ld. at 176-77. Under the Supremacy Clause the answer must be that the
Constitution as law must be preferred over the legislation in question.
137. I do not mean this point to be as self-referencing as it may sound. Obviously, I
am sensitive to the difficulty that one cannot say what government "under" the Consti-
tution is until one first takes a position in the evolution v. de-evolution debate. All I
mean to imply by the text is that the policy scientist may reject proposed constitutional
interpretations simply because they do not accord with her judgment on desirable policy.
In this the policy scientist makes essentially the same move as the moralist. See infra
note 139.
138. For a particularly sharp example, see Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Pro-
cess-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
139. One may say 6f the policy scientist what Alexander Bickel wrote of the moral-
ist: "[T]he moralist will find it difficult to sacrifice his aims in favor of structure and
process, to sacrifice substance for form." A BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 30 (1975).
One may also repeat Professor Bickel's reply: "Yet process and form, which is the em-
bodiment of process, are the essence of the theory and practice of constitutionalism." ld.
But for good measure, one ought also to bear in mind the riposte of both the moralist
and the policy scientist to all of this, to wit, that the separation of substance and process
is illusory.
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driven entirely by its zeal to achieve stated ends,140 and Grant
Gilmore's Kafkaesque evocation of a society so bound up in the
forms of law that it becomes a living hell,141 drifts the moder-
ately progressive American constitutional ideal. I am not at all
sure that we best pursue it by freeing our legislature entirely
from the bonds of constitutionalism,142 trusting to nothing but
the independent and largely unguided judgment of the courts to
decide when the legislature goes too far.
B. The Dangers of De-Evolution
1. The policy problem
When the National Security Act of 1947 created the Air
Force as a separate branch of the armed services,143 some mem-
bers of the Congress worried that a constitutional amendment
might be necessary.144 Mter all, the Constitution grants to the
Congress only the authority "[t]o raise and support Armies,"1411
"[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,"146 and "[t]o make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces."147 There is not a word about air forces or an Air Force
or even air, nor is there reference to a discretion to establish
armed forces generally. Nothing anywhere suggests that the
Framers had in mind the adaptation of the war power to a
changing technology that would permit soldiers to fly. There is
only an army, which is the "land Force" and which is not to be a
standing army148 (the Framers' conception of what an army
140. See generally S. SCHANBERG, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF DITH PRAN (1980)
(describing Kampuchea).
141. "The values of an unjust society will reflect themselves in an unjust law. The
worse the society, the more law there will be. In Hell there will be nothing but law, and
due process will be meticulously observed." G. GILMORE. THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111
(1977).
142. I mean of course the constitutionalism of process. As far as I know, no one
advocates an institutional evolution that would lead to the trampling of individual
rights, but that conclusion depends, of course, on a prior conclusion about what rights
the individual possesses.
143. 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1947).
144. "A California member of the House introduced a resolution looking to a consti-
tutional amendment authorizing the establishment of an air force, but nothing happened
to it." E.S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 111 n.337 (H. Chase
& C. Ducat 14th ed. 1978) (citation omitted).
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (emphasis added).
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13 (emphasis added).
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (emphasis added).
148. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 12: "[N]o Appropriation of Money to that Use
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would be was quite a narrow one149); and a navy, the "naval
Force," apparently intended to move on the sea.
What should a de-evolutionary judge do if faced with a con-
tention that the Congress exceeded the scope of its authority in
establishing an Air Force? The original understanding certainly
did not provide for an Air Force, and the Framers, who spent
enormous time and effort working out precisely what armed
forces they thought the united nation would need, took pains to
specify, both in the text and in their debates, how sharp the lim-
its were on what troops the government would have at its com-
mand.1llo A judge who uses history in the almost slavish way that
the Court did in Chadha and Synar, as revealing a world view
that must be preserved intact, could easily rationalize a decision
to sustain the establishment of armed forces that fly. To say
that the original understanding must be re-interpreted in light
of technological advance-a plausible-sounding answer-is in
fact to step firmly into the evolutionary world, because there is
no apparent reason to say that fresh knowledge about the sci-
ence of aeronautics matters, whereas fresh knowledge about the
science of politics or economics does not. There is no escape
through some lurking hypothetical judgment on the part of the
Framers that the Congress would adapt the military might of
the United States to meet each fresh crisis because there was no
such judgment. The original understanding seems unambiguous:
So much of an armed force and no more.llll
[supporting armies] shall be for a longer Term than two Years." The federal government
has consistently taken the position that the two-year appropriation restriction does not
apply to the Navy or the Air Force. See, e.g., 40 Gp. Att'y Gen. 555 (1948).
149. Those who wrote and ratified the Constitution, many of them terrified of a
large standing army that might become a power center, apparently envisioned a small
national armed force that would, if necessary, supplement the state militias in putting
down domestic rebellion or repulsing foreign invasion. See W. REVELEY, WAR POWERS OF
THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 59-65 (1981).
150. In particular, as Alexander Hamilton emphasized in The Federalist, supporters
of ratification pointed out that the only forces that would exist were those that the Con-
gress authorized. He drew a contrast on this point between the United States and Brit-
ain, where the monarch could raise the troops as well as lead them. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 69 (A. Hamilton).
151. I do not mean to suggest that the original understanding is unambiguous in the
sense that it was unanimous or that it is certain or even that it is knowable; I am fully
cognizant of the hermeneutical problems. See infra notes 244-46. The method illustrated
by this paragraph is the method that the courts actually use, as best I am able to under-
stand it. Having used the tools of the kind on which the courts usually rely in finding the
original understanding, I conclude that a court would find the original understanding
unambiguous.
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Similarly, as Erwin Chemerinsky has pointed out, the men
who wrote and ratified the Constitution probably neither ex-
pected nor intended that anyone but a male would ever serve as
President of the United States.lli2 This original understanding is
as good as written into the document: The President is always
referred to as "He," and there is nothing to suggest that the
masculine pronoun was meant to include the feminine. lli3 It may
even be the case (and here, I am less familiar with the evidence)
that the Framers adopted the system that they did in part to
perpetuate a patriarchal vision of how the world ought to
work.1li4 Or perhaps (and my caveat is the same) they considered
the attributes of "maleness," as they understood them, vital to
the success of their carefully worked out scheme of balanced and
separated powers. In either of these circumstances, the Framers
would have shared an understanding (albeit perhaps an unar-
ticulated one) that the election of a woman-that any important
role for a woman in governance of their new nation-would dis-
rupt their system of government. What, then, ought a de-evolu-
tionary judge to do if faced with the election of a woman as
President?
The kind of rigid formalism that is said by critics to charac-
terize the reasoning in such decisions as Chadha and Synar
might well, on this evidence, lead to the conclusion that the Air
Force is unconstitutional and that a woman cannot serve as
Chief Executive. One who is convinced by more contemporary
hermeneutic approaches to historical reasoning might argue that
both the Air Force and the first female President could be saved
by using the evidence to try to reconstruct, in our own imagina-
tions, the entire world of the Framers, then in effect to step into
their world (in' our minds) and tell them about ours, letting the
answers generated by that imaginary conversation give meaning
to the textual provisions at issue.llili So far, however, the de-evo-
152. See Chemerinsky, Wrong Questions Get Wrong Answers: An Analysis of Pro-
fessor Carter's Approach to Judicial Review, 66 B.U.L. REV. 47, 56 (1986).
153. As one of my teachers suggested years ago, discussing the history of the com-
mon law, "In those days, when the judge said 'reasonable man,' that is almost certainly
what he meant."
154. For an argument that the patriarchal vision-if it existed-was in the throes of
dramatic change at the time of the American Revolution, see J. F'LIEGELMAN, PRODIGALS
AND PILGRIMS: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AGAINST PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY, 1750-1800
(1982).
155. See generally D. HoY, THE CRITICAL CmCLE: LITERATURE, HISTORY, AND PHILO-
SOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS (1978). For a legal theorist's effort, see Tushnet, Following the
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lutionary opinions handed down by the Supreme Court have evi-
denced little sensitivity toward the potential shortcomings of the
preferred historical method, and consequently there has been no
reason for the Justices to argue at this level of sophistication.
They prefer to use the historical materials for the arguably ahis-
torical task of discovering concrete answers to the questions
before them, worshiping, in the metaphor used earlier, at the
shrine of the ancestors who lived and fought and designed a na-
tion in the Golden Age.
Nevertheless, the de-evolutionary tradition might have an-
swers to the potentially absurd results in these hypothetical
cases. The de-evolutionary judge might respond that she reads
the historical evidence differently, or even finds it unclear, but
unless we want to pretend that the Constitution and its history
are perfect, that they grant license for everything that we like
and forbid only what we do not,llS6 then it is useful to assume
that the evidence is as plain as one could ask. Mter all, the argu-
ment that evidence is unclear is presumably available to save
any congressional initiative that the judge wants to save, and in-
dulging so malleable an argument defeats the legitimating func-
tion of the de-evolutionary tradition. Advocates of the de-evolu-
tionary tradition are assuming a particular standard of historical
proof, and it is surely a standard short of certainty.
Yet unless the rigid rules reflected in de-evolutionary opin-
ions are ignored (one might also say "softened") in particular
cases, the de-evolutionary judge really does risk reaching results
so absurd that they might make mockery of the judicial func-
tion. The de-evolutionary judge would probably sacrifice the dis-
ciplining rules of the tradition in cases of this nature. Doing so,
Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV.
781 (1983). My discussions of hermeneutics, both here and later in this article, also owe
much to the. essays collected in A GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS: MAJOR
TRENDS IN BIBILICAL INTERPRETATION (D. McKim ed. 1986).
156. For a stylish critique of this notion, see Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981). A less generous version of the argument is Reynolds, Secur-
ing Equal Liberty in an Egalitarian Age, The Earl W. Nelson Memorial Lecture, Univer-
sity of Missouri School of Law, Columbia, Missouri (Sept. 12, 1986) (unpublished
speech). The liberal insistence that the courts can protect a substantial subset of the
rights defined by the liberal political program, and that in so doing the courts are acting
as a legitimate brake on the will of the majority, bespeaks a potential contradiction so
great that it might reasonably be described as the principal failure of liberal constitu-
tional theory. Cf. Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1361 (1979) (making
the point from the right); Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO
ST. L.J. 411 (1981) (making the point from the left).
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however, requires resort to some extra-constitutional set of val-
ues that will tell the judge which cases are appropriate for what
will be, in substance if not in form, an evolutionary rather than
a de-evolutionary approach. Once the judge turns to an extra-
constitutional source for the answer, she is doing nothing differ-
ent than what her evolutionary colleague proposes to do with
deference to congressional judgment on necessity.
It may be that the de-evolutionary judge will permit the
new institutional arrangement-the fresh check-in a smaller
number of cases than will the evolutionary judge, and this quan-
titative distinction might well have qualitative significance on
the issue of legitimacy.Ili7 Yet this essentially empirical assertion
is also beside the point, because in order to decide which cases
are appropriate ones for the import of extra-constitutional val-
ues, the de-evolutionary judge must test against her standard
every case. The judge may reply that she is testing only the diffi-
cult cases against her standard, but that answer does no more
than move the problem to a different level of abstraction. The
judge is still invoking an extra-constitutional source, this time to
tell her which cases are the difficult ones. From this paradox
there is no apparent escape.
2. The logical problems
But even if these policy problems did not exist, the funda-
mental weakness of the de-evolutionary tradition should be
plain: Even assuming away, for the sake of the argument, all the
important hermeneutical questions involved with trying to piece
together meaning of a text from historical fragments written by
and about those who created it,tli8 the advocate of the de-evolu-
tionary tradition relies on either a logical fallacy or an interpre-
tive tautology. Because appeal to history has become such an
important part of both jurisprudence and scholarship, and not
merely when the subject is the separation of powers, it is worth
considering both points in some detail.
a. The logical fallacy. The logical fallacy of the de-evolu-
157. As Owen Fiss has pointed out, the fact that judges may err does not make their
decisions illegitimate. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 748
(1982) ("Not every mistake in adjudication is an example of lawlessness."). By implica-
tion, lawlessness turns in part on the frequency of error.
158. See, e.g., H. PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY (1981) (denying the possibil-
ity of distinguishing between descriptive and evaluative analysis).
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tionary use of history may best be understood by restating the
de-evolutionary argument syllogistically:
(a) If the Framers did not want the separation of powers
to evolve, they would have omitted any explicit provision for
that evolution.
(b) The Framers omitted any explicit provision for that
evolution.
(c) Therefore, the Framers did not want the separation of
powers to evolve.
To logicians, this deceptive syllogistic structure exemplifies
the logical fallacy of confirming the consequent. In this struc-
ture, irrefutably correct premises may be stated in support of
conclusions that they do not prove. All that is really proved is
that the conclusion is one possible explanation for the observed
minor premise-which is known from the outset. The strong
form of deductive reasoning, which is irrefutable as long as the
major and minor premises are accurate, runs like this:
(a) All lawyers are thieves.
(b) Holmes is a lawyer.
(c) Therefore, Holmes is a thief.
The fallacy of confirming the consequent would structure the ar-
gument in this fashion:
(a) All lawyers are thieves.
(b) Holmes is a thief.
(c) Therefore, Holmes is a lawyer.
The point of the fallacy is that Holmes may be a thief for any
number of reasons, even if he is not a lawyer. Similarly, the
Framers may have omitted any mention of evolution of the sep-
aration of powers for any number of reasons, even if they had no
concrete intention to forbid it. They may have thought the right
of the Congress to reorganize the forms of government too obvi-
ous to need discussion; they may have preferred to leave the in-
stitutional arrangements to be resolved by future generations; or
they may have left historical fragments yet undiscovered in
which they pursue the matter in detail. Thus, the mere absence
of available historical evidence is not proof that the Framers in-
tended to forbid anything. The fact that there is "nothing in the
history" to show that the Framers intended to approve legisla-
tive vetoes or civil damages awards against the President is not,
by itself, proof that they would not have permitted either one,
had the question ever arisen or had different records survived.
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Even if one believes, moreover, that the historical records
are adequate, there remains the difficulty of where we ought to
search. The Supreme Court, for example, seems most frequently
to cite the records of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, and
constitutional scholars regularly follow the Court's example. But
those records were sealed, unavailable to the ratifiers except in
the form of carefully orchestrated polemics on either side.169
Whatever the recorded views of those who wrote the Constitu-
tion, the Constitution draws its authority from its ratification,
not its drafting, and it was ratified in the state conventions that
voted for it. The debates in those conventions and the public
argument that preceded them and continued long after they en-
ded should thus be considered the document's true legislative
history.16o Until well into the twentieth century, when Professor
Farrand compiled and published his edition of Madison's notes
on the Philadelphia Convention, judges called upon to construe
the provisions of the Constitution managed quite well without
detailed discussions of what the Framers actually said to one an-
other in their private debates.16l It is a bit peculiar to say now,
two hundred years after ratification, that the history that really
matters is that secret history that played no role in the nation's
decision to adopt the new Constitution.
This is by no means an argument against any use of history
in adjudicating separation of powers cases. But the almost
mechanical way in which the history is generally examined is
logically incorrect, given what its advocates are seeking to
demonstrate.
b. The interpretive tautology. The interpretive methodol-
ogy of the de-evolutionary tradition proceeds from the central
insight that the Framers spent considerable time working out
the ways in which the various branches of the government they
were designing should deploy their powers and check and bal-
ance one another. That this is what happened seems, as a matter
159. See Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documen-
tary Record, 65 'rEx. L. REv. 1, 2 (1986).
160. For discussions on whose intent should matter to true originalists, see, e.g.,
Brest, supra note 93, at 214-15; Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
469, 482-88 (1981).
161. The first edition of Farrand's compilation was published in 1911. See generally
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION (M. Farrand ed. 1911). On the tools used by
judges to interpret the Constitution in the years following ratification (when the notes of
the Convention were unavailable), see Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 913-24 (1985).
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of history, essentially indisputable.162 Whether its interpretive
consequences are as clear as the de-evolutionary judge believes
is, however, a different question. Once again, it is useful to state
the argument syllogistically:
(a) Constitutions should be interpreted according to the
views of those who wrote them.
(b) The Framers wrote the Constitution.
(c) Therefore, the Constitution should be interpreted
according to the views of the Framers.
The weakness of this syllogism is obvious: The major premise
(a) essentially states what the de-evolutionary judge sets out to
prove in the first place. Any effort at independent verification of
premise (a) will end up looking an awful lot like the syllogism
under examination.
But this particular statement of the interpretive argument
leading the de-evolutionary judge back into the Golden Age is
too simplistic. The de-evolutionary judge need not demonstrate
that the history is the preferred source of authority in every
case. The judge might even concede that in some cases-cases
regarding the protection of individual rights, for example-the
importation of other materials in an effort to breathe life into
the text is sometimes appropriate.163 With respect to the struc-
tural clauses, however, the de-evolutionary judge is likely to re-
main adamant: The text is to be read through the glass of his-
tory, and arguments over morality and public policy are better.
addressed to another forum. The judge, in fact, has no choice
but to insist, because the de-evolutionary tradition links history
and legitimacy so closely. Thus, the restated syllogism might run
like this:
(a) When the authors of a Constitution have spent
considerable effort at working out a precise scheme
for the operation of government, their views are
binding on later interpreters.
162. The hermeneutical difficulties that might prevent a present-day reader from
fully appreciating the Framers' concerns do not prevent the reader from knowing that
the concerns were there. See infra text accompanying notes 292-99.
163. I have argued elsewhere that as long as the interpretive rules tightly discipline
adjudication under the Constitution's structural clauses, some degree of freedom for ju-
dicial maneuver might be appropriate when adjudication proceeds under the more
broadly written clauses protecting individual rights. See Carter, Constitutional Adjudi-
cation and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94
YALE L.J. 821 (1985).
HeinOnline -- 1987 BYU L. Rev. 760 1987
760 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1987
(b) The Framers spent considerable effort at working
out a precise scheme for the operation of
government.
(c) Therefore, the views of the Framers are binding on
later interpreters.
But the tautology has not been eliminated; it has only been cam-
ouflaged. Premise (a) still states the argument, and an indepen-
dent proof of that premise is still required.
I will not belabor the point with repeated examples; the
formula should by now be sufficiently clear that the interested
reader can perform the necessary iterations. I would suggest,
however, that at the end there lies an ultimate syllogism mark-
ing the de-evolutionary tradition, a syllogism that might run
something like this:
(a) We should follow the intentions of a Constitution's
authors when the authors so intended.
(b) The Framers intended that we follow their
intentions.
(c) Therefore, we should follow the intentions of the
Constitution's authors.
The tautology is still present, only now it is even worse. Now the
major premise is itself tautological in its self-referencing: "Fol-
low intentions when the intentions are that they be followed. "16'
At this level, the argument for following the history has been
reduced to gibberish, the more so because of the paucity of evi-
dence for the second part of the tautology, the premise that the
Framers wanted later generations bound to their intentions.161S
In fact, the need for historical guidance is rendered coherent
only when approached in a fashion quite different from that
usually chosen by the courts and commentators in their efforts
to justify the de-evolutionary tradition.
C. Things Fall Apart: The Problem With Muddling Through
If neither tradition seems wholly satisfactory, then perhaps
we should continue as we have been-muddling through, waiting
164. The realization that this premise is tautological is hardly original. See, e.g.,
Chemerinsky, supra note 152, at 59; Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187,
193 n.22 (1981).
165. Cf. Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885 (1985) (arguing that the Framers did not expect future interpreters to seek the
meaning of the document from external evidence of the Framers' intent).
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for the courts to rule on the institutions and procedures estab-
lished by the Congress, rarely able from one year to the next to
predict how the Justices will view the next problem to arise.
Muddling may not be so bad as it sounds, for no matter what
the level of doctrinal incoherence, it can hardly be said that the
separation of powers jurisprudence has led to the sort of disas-
trous oppression, tyranny of the legislature, or tyranny of the
judges, that some predict should the Court not come up with a
clearer and more coherent jurisprudence (and also a correct one)
of fundamental rights. lGG So maybe nothing is broken, and noth-
ing need be fixed.
Actually, that conclusion has matters exactly backward. We
may be able to afford to muddle-to let the Court mean-
der-when the issue is the construction of the provisions of the
first, fifth, or fourteenth amendments. For reasons set out else-
where, judicial muddling on issues of fundamental rights does
not necessarily represent a threat to the legitimacy of American
constitutional democracy.167 It may instead promote a healthy
dialogue on the proper contours of those rights.1GB The structural
constitutional provisions, however, present quite a different in-
terpretive problem, because in our Constitution they serve quite
a different constitutive purpose. All of the Constitution's clauses
serve in some sense to restrain the power of the state that they
constitute, but the structural clauses, unlike the clauses protect-
ing individual rights, are concerned with authority as well as
power. The individual right clauses may be used to establish a
catalogue of ends that the state may not pursue, but in a nation
whose theory of government rests on a written Constitution,
merely concluding that an end is not prohibited cannot possibly
demonstrate the state's authority to act as it wishes. There re-
mains the question of how the constitutional state is permitted
to pursue its ends, and the structural clauses are the place, if
there is one, where the answer must be found when the citizen
demands of her government: "By what right do you do this?"
"In reality," Garry Wills has written, "nations get away with
166. See, e.g., Berger, Paul Brest's Brief for an Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. 1
(1981); Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEx. L. REV. 383 (1985).
167. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 118; Schauer, supra note 125; Wellington, The Na-
ture of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486 (1982). Recent dialogic conceptions of constitu-
tional adjudication owe much to the work of the late Alexander Bickel, especially The
Morality of Consent which described an "endlessly renewed educational conversation"
between the Supreme Court and its constituency. A. BICKEL, supra note 139, at 111.
168. See Carter, supra note 51, at 851-63.
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whatever they feel they can, principle or no.m69 Although Pro-
fessor Wills wrote these words in the course of a discussion of
international relations, the central claim. still points to the fun-
damental problem which liberal political theory was developed
to resolve-the tyranny inherent in the notion of the state. Lib-
eral theorists have approached the problem by creating ever-
more-sophisticated visions of "authority" without which the
state cannot act lawfully. The raw power of the state may still
lead to oppression, but in the absence of authority, the oppres-
sion is a lawless one, and its appearance dissolves the claim of
the state on the allegience of its citizens. A state without author-
ity, in short, is a state that cannot lawfully repress popular
revolution.170
Institutional design is crucial to an appreciation of the na-
ture of a state's authority. One may believe, with the main-
stream liberal theorists and with many of the Framers, that the
great danger to any community is the tendency of citizens to-
ward self-aggrandizement; that the state exists primarily to pre-
vent citizens from oppressing their neighbors for the sake of this
tendency toward "possessive individualism";l71 and that the in-
stitutions of the state must be designed in a way that also re-
stricts the natural tendency of those citizens who serve the state
to do the same thing. Or one may begin, as others among the
Framers did, from republican premises, considering the state as
a means for the promotion of virtue and a sense of civic respon-
sibility, and concluding that the institutions of the state must be
designed to alleviate the likelihood or at least the effects of cor-
ruption, that is, in Bruce Ackerman's fine phrase, to "economize
169. Wills, Critical Inquiry (Kritik) in Clausewitz, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETA-
TION 159, 175 (W. Mitchell ed. 1983) [hereinafter THE POLmcs OF INTERPRETATION].
170. Ct. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 112 (1971) ("By the principle of fairness it
is not possible to be bound to unjust institutions, or at least to institutions which exceed
the limits of tolerable injustice ..•. In particular, it is not possible to have an obliga-
tion to autocratic and arbitrary forms of government."). Joseph Raz has suggested deter-
mining the "legitimacy" of authority in part by the role of that authority in people's
practical decisions about what they ought to do. RAZ, Authority and Justification, PHIL.
& PUB. AFF., Winter, 1985, at 3. But of course the problem for today's moral theorists is
what it was for Locke: One person's legitimate authority might be another's illegitimate
oppression. Ct. I. SHAPIRO. THE EvOLUTION OF RIGHTS IN LmERAL THEORY 113-18 (1986)
(discussing lack of standards in Lockean right to resist).
171. See generally C. MACPHERSON. THE POLmCAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDMDU-
ALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962) (identifying "freedom as possession" as a central tenet in
liberal thought).
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on virtue."172 But under either set of premises-and it seems
clear that those who wrote and ratified the Constitution pro-
ceeded under one or the other or some admixture of the
two-authority and institutional design are inextricably linked.
The state acts legitimately only when the institutions of the
state are established in a way that limits the possibility of self-
aggrandizement by state officials, minimizes the effect of the
corruption of those officials, or both. Because institutional de-
sign is precisely what the Constitution's structural clauses are
about, those clauses are the place to search for the legitimacy,
and hence the authority, of the national government the docu-
ment establishes.
The problem of authority is also central to that subset of
liberal political theory that we call constitutional theory. Main-
stream constitutional theorists take as a fundamental precept
the authority of the Constitution itself. The main task of consti-
tutional theory was for many years what might be called the
"justification project," and for many theorists it still is. The jus-
tification project propounds and tests principles that the theo-
rists hope will show why the pronouncements of the Supreme
Court should be considered as authoritative as the provisions of
the document those pronouncements interpret. As a result of
that testing, some principles become for a time a part of the par-
adigm within the limits of which constitutional theorists work,173
but as the principles are subjected to greater scrutiny, most are
discarded. That search continues, and it is an important search,
although in its most controversial form-the hunt for the Grand
Theory to "prove" the rightness or wrongness of decisions on
which rights are fundamental and which are not-it is somewhat
beside the present point.
Yet the fundamental rights cases deserve a brief mention.
The explosion in the Court's fundamental rights jurisprudence
and the rise of the administrative state-two developments that
virtually coincide as historical moments-have provided the im-
petus that drives another, more explicitly normative group of
172. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE
L.J. 1013, 1031 (1984) ("In response to the perception that public-regarding virtue is in
short supply, The Federalist proposes a democratic constitution that tries to economize
on virtue.") (emphasis in original).
173. I obviously borrow, albeit weakly, from Thomas Kuhn's classic work, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). For an intriguing, although flawed,
effort at more rigorous application of this analogy, see Tushnet, Deviant Science in Con-
stitutional Law, 59 TEx. L. REV. 815 (1981).
HeinOnline -- 1987 BYU L. Rev. 764 1987
764 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1987
constitutional theorists. For this second group, authority is less
important than efficacy, and finding a theory that ties particular
results to the Constitution is less important than demonstrating
that those results are good. These are troubled times for the no-
tion of authority, nearly unbearable ones for proponents of lib-
eral democratic theory, and those constitutional theorists who
have never been much concerned with authority, are now in
much the same position as a group of farmers in Chinua
Achebe's novel Things Fall Apart to which I earlier made refer-
ence. These were the farmers who watched the labor of their
neighbors while rarely planting any crops of their own, then
laughed at the long drought and torrential rains that destroyed
their neighbors' crops:
Some farmers had not planted their yams yet. They were
the lazy easy-going ones who always put off clearing their
farms as long as they could. This year they were the wise ones.
They sympathized with their neighbors with much shaking of
the head, but inwardly they were happy for what they took to
be their own foresight. 174
The theorists who disbelieve in the notion of authority, like the
farmers who dawdled and procrastinated and planted no crops,
might well feel like saying, "We told you so," and those who
have struggled to demonstrate the possibility of legitimacy may
have no ready rejoinder.
But it is precisely at such times as this, when the notion
that legal authority can really be demonstrated is most in doubt,
that it is especially crucial to try. The rule of law in general, and
of constitutional law in particular, will not be possible unless
some connection can be shown between what the government
does and what the Constitution permits. Because constitutional
authority will flow from the clauses establishing the structure of
the government (if indeed it flows from anywhere), the analysis
of those structural clauses, and of the system of balanced and
separated powers that they establish, seems the sensible place to
begin. Thus, unless the jurisprudence regarding the structure of
the government, including the system of balanced and separated
powers, relies for its force on disciplining interpretive rules capa-
ble of generating answers that are in most cases relatively deter-
minate, the legitimacy of the entire project of constitutionalism,
and of judicial review in particular, is set seriously at risk.
174. C. ACHEBE. supra note 84, at 25.
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IV. THE HARD CHOICE, AND ITS RATIONALE
Neither choice is entirely attractive, but a judge who must
decide a case requiring interpretation of the political Constitu-
tion17t1-the Constitution of government structure-must choose
nevertheless. If, as I have argued, merely continuing to mud-
dle-relying on instinctive guesses and a rough common
sense-will do little to promote the legitimacy of the constitu-
tional system, then the judge requires a set of rules to discipline
what would otherwise be complete creative freedom. Interpretive
rules that serve to render the constitutional provisions establish-
ing the separation of powers relatively determinate, that help
give them content independent of judicial bias, will serve the
purpose of restraint better than rules that do not. Any interpre-
tive rule defined with sufficient rigor can serve this purpose,176
but if the matter in issue is the justification for judicial action
under the structural clauses, not all rules are equally valid.
For reasons that I will explain, the aims of liberal demo-
cratic theory and of constitutionalism generally will best be
served if interpretation of the structural provisions of the politi-
cal Constitution begins, and frequently ends, with consideration
of the text and its historical background. And while as currently
practiced, the de-evolutionary tradition relies on a historical
methodology that contemporary hermeneutical theory (as well
as simple logic) reveals as bankrupt, de-evolutionary judges nev-
ertheless are steering closer to the winds of legitimacy than are
their evolutionary colleagues. Thus, I will propose a modified
version of the de-evolutionary approach to adjudication under
the structural clauses, an approach which will supply a better set
of interpretive rules, and thus a more legitimate and legitimat-
ing set of results, than will its evolutionary cousin. I will further
argue that even the de-evolutionary tradition, properly under-
stood, leaves substantial room for development of new institu-
tions for the exercise of governmental power, because, when the
history and text fail to supply answers that are sufficiently clear,
the deference that characterizes the evolutionary tradition is ap-
175. I define the "political Constitution" with a smidgen more precision in Carter,
supra note 118, at 72-81. See also Carter, supra note 163, at 853-70.
176. I mean this to be a partial rejection-although not a refutation-of the decon-
structionist claim that "there are no texts, but only interpretations." See H. Bloom, The
Breaking of Form, in H. BLOOM, P. DE MAN, J. DERRIDA, G. HARTMAN, & J. MILLER,
DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICISM 1, 7 (1979) [hereinafter DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICISM].
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propriate, and the means for exercising that deference is the
much-maligned political question doctrine.
To understand why the de-evolutionary approach, although
in need of modification, is the more sensible one, it is necessary
first to sketch very briefly the reasons that the major figures in
the development of liberal political theory in general, and the
authors of the American Constitution in particular, thought that
the legitimacy of government required that the powers of gov-
ernment be distributed among its agencies in a way that permit-
ted them to check and balance one another. With that under-
standing, it will be possible to investigate the relationship
between the reasons that moved the Framers and the nature and
legitimacy of constitutional adjudication as we have come to un-
derstand it. From this investigation will flow the reasons to re-
ject the evolutionary tradition and to establish the modified de-
evolutionary tradition as the proper guide for separation of pow-
ers jurisprudence.
A. Historical Currents
The notion that the powers of the government should be
balanced and separated in order to avoid tyranny is much older
than the American Constitution.177 The notion is older than the
writings of Montesquieu, whose views on the relationship be-
tween citizen and state powerfully influenced those who
designed the American system of federal government.178 It is
older, too, than the work of Locke, whose Second Treatise was
177. Some notion of checks and balances, whether formal or not, might be implied
in the very idea of government. Certainly it is implied in the idea of constitutional gov-
ernment. This is by no means a recent discovery. For example, in 1901, James Bryce of
Oxford published a study of governance in various societies through the ages, illustrating
different ways in which checks and balances operate in each. See generally 1 J. BRYCE,
STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE (1901).
178. Although, as Rogers Smith has pointed out, it is a mistake to ignore the effect
of the principles set down by the natural law liberal John Locke, see R. SMITH, supra
note 12, at 15-16, it was the republican Montesquieu (along with James Harrington)
whose political theory was far more influential in developing the original American con-
stitutional structure.
The role of political theory in the deliberations of the Framers is entitled to more
detailed and graceful treatment than I am capable of in this paper, and fortunately has
received it. See, e.g, B. BAILYN, THE lDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967); F. McDoNALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CON-
STITUTION (1985); J. POCOCK, supra note 72; G. WILLS, supra note 127; G. WOOD, supra
note 127.
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read and either refined or misunderstood by Montesquieu.179 In
fact, some vague notion of checks and balances has existed as
long as there have been theories of government, although, as
M.J.C. Vile has pointed out, there is a historical limit beyond
which one cannot sensibly go in seeking the origin of the theory:
"The idea of an autonomous 'legislative power' is dependent
upon the emergence of the idea that law could be made by
human agency, that there was real power to make law, to legis-
late."l80 If laws are handed down by God, then there is no role
for humanity but enforcement. Of course this, too, is a kind of
separation of powers, the divine and the mortal, but it is a weak
model at best.
In seeking the early articulation of ideas that sound like our
modern notion of the separation of powers, one might look, for
example, at Plato's Republic, where Socrates is quoted as saying:
I suppose that if the rulers are to be worthy of the name, and
their auxiliaries likewise, the latter will be willing to do what
they are commanded and the former to command. In some of
their commands the rulers will in turn be obeying the laws; in
others-all those we leave to their discretion-they will imitate
the laws.l8l
Or one might seek the origins in the political theories of Aris-
totle and Cicero, who argued for a vigorous separation of the
lawgiving and administrative functions of rule.182 But these are
false leads; it is unlikely that the theorists of classical antiquity
had in mind anything remotely resembling what we now think of
as the separation of powers, largely because they shared nothing
approaching the modern conception of liberal democracy.
179. The eighteenth-century British political theory so influential on early American
thought "owed more to Machiavelli and Montesquieu than it did to Locke." G. WOOD,
supra note 127, at 29. See generally J. POCOCK, supra note 72. The colonial pamphleteers
of popular mythology may not even have been terribly conversant with Locke's work, see
B. BAILYN, supra note 178, at 28 ("The citations are plentiful, but the knowledge they
reflect ... is at times superficial. Locke is cited often with precision on points of politi-
cal theory, but at other times he is referred to in the most ofthand way, as if he could be
relied on to support anything the writers happened to be arguing."), or, for that matter,
with much else, see G. WOOD, supra note 127, at 14 ("They cited and borrowed promiscu-
ously from almost every conceivable English writer."). But even if the influential think-
ers of the time did not read Locke's Two Treatises with care (or perhaps at all), there is
evidence of a relatively widespread familiarity with some of his other work. See J.
FLIEGELMAN, supra note 154, at 38.
180. M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 24 (1967).
181. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, bk. V, para. 458c (A. Bloom trans. 1968).
182. See M. VILE, supra note 180, at 21-27.
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Rather, the political theory of ancient Rome and Greece, one
that was to dominate political thought through much of the
Middle Ages, was the theory of mixed government.183
"Mixed government" theories are found, albeit in somewhat
different forms, in the works of Aristotle, Plato, and Polybius,
and were later echoed by both theologians and secular political
theorists throughout Europe until the outbreak of the English
Civil War. The theory of mixed government held that in order to
succeed, a government must divide its authority among the pow-
erful interest groups in society, so that no one of them can domi-
nate the others.184 As Polybius put it in his Histories, the gov-
ernment should be arranged so that no group, "exceeding its
own norm, might veer toward its own perversion."l81> Each one,
he wrote, by "pulling the other back, might keep the balance
from sinking much to either side."l8S Mixed government theory
is in one sense a theory about democracy, concluding as it does
with some requirement of representation. In another sense, it is
a theory about structure, because of its emphasis on balancing as
a means for preventing oppression. Ultimately, however, it is a
pragmatic theory about what government must do to survive,
because as the ancients were clearly aware, a government that
ignored or oppressed powerful constituents was simply providing
a focus for the discontent that could ruin the experiment with
national government.187
Mixed government theory is different from separation of
powers theory because it emphasizes a distribution of govern-
183. See G. WILLS, supra note 127, at 97-107 (intellectual history of the theory). For
a particularly evocative analysis of mixed government in Aristotelian thought, see J.
POCOCK, supra note 72, at 66-77.
Montesquieu is routinely accused of misunderstanding the distinction between
mixed government and separation of powers. See, e.g., id. at 480 (Montesquieu was af-
fected by Bolingbroke's confiation of "the languages of function and morality."); F. Mc-
DONALD, supra note 178, at 80 (similar point).
184. The theory was not justified in precisely these terms. Rather, mixed govern-
ment theorists saw themselves as borrowing the most attractive features of monarchy
(rule of the one), aristocracy (rule of the few), and democracy (rule of the many), while
avoiding the "perversions" of each: the tendencies respectively of monarchy to degener-
ate into despotism, of aristocracy to collapse into factionalism, and of democracy to dis-
integrate into anarchy. See G. WOOD, supra note 127, at 197-98.
185. POLYBIUS, HISTORIES, bk. 6, § 10,1. 7, quoted in G. WILLS, supra note 127, at 99.
186. Id.
187. Described this way, mixed government theory has much in common with the
political theory of pluralism, whose intellectual precursor it obviously is. Ct. R. DAHL,
supra note 115 (arguing that interest groups will interact within a democracy without
regard to governmental structure).
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ment functions among interest groups, rather than a distribution
among agencies without regard to who may run them. But the
theories are similar, too, because each sees the necessity of
avoiding the concentration of power within a small circle within
the government, and each seeks to avoid this concentration and
its concommitant oppression through diffusing the powers of
government in ways that permit someone-a coalition of interest
groups or a combination of autonomous agencies-to check and
balance any potential concentration.
In medieval Europe, the theory of mixed government was
pressed in support of the argument that recognition of the power
of feudal lords and a degree of respect for popular will were ap-
propriate restraints on what would otherwise be the unbridled
authority of the king.I88 Thus, the barons whose arms kept the
king from falling and the people at large, on whose peace he
equally relied, should have some formal role in checking his au-
thority. He could not govern without them, and he therefore
should not be permitted to try. By the seventeenth century the
theory dominated among political philosophers in England, too,
and seemed an acceptable theory of politics until the English
Civil War revealed its weakness and arguably ended its ascen-
dancy. A theory of government that could not resolve such a
conflict short of bloodshed was inadequate on its face; by the
time Charles I was finally executed, the theory of mixed govern-
ment, although retaining its name, had evolved into something
quite different, although not quite as different as it would be-
come in the wake of the American Revolution.
Quoting Professor Vile once more: "The execution of the
King, and the abolition of the House of Lords, destroyed the
institutional basis of the theory of mixed government, and any
justification of the new constitution which was to be framed for
England would have to rest upon a different theoretical ba-
sis."189 Mixed government could not explain the way a nation
was to be ruled when two of the great power centers that had
served as balances under the theory, the monarchy and the aris-
tocracy, had been overthrown. Cromwell's solution, although he
gave it no name, was a theory of separation of powers. The new
188. No matter what view one takes of the nature of feudal society-and several are
available-it is plain that the feudal system of governance rested in part on an apprecia-
tion of the interdependence among those holding practical power in society. See N. CAN-
TOR, MEDIEVAL HISTORY: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF A CIVILIZATION 214-23 (2d ed. 1969).
189. M. VILE, supra note 180, at 47.
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Constitution provided for a Lord Protector and a Parliament
who would, through a distribution of administrative and legisla-
tive functions between them, be able to check any tendency in
the other toward tyrannical rule.190 Although the Protectorate
did not long endure, by the time of the Restoration the twin
notions of a rule of law that would bind even the monarch and
of checks and balances to prevent the tyranny of at least the
legislature were firmly established in English politics.191
John Locke, although clearly not writing on a blank slate,
took upon himself the task of harmonizing these twin notions. If
the legislature was supreme, what sense did it make to say that
there were checks on its activities? And if checks were to be
placed on legislative activity, how could one describe the legisla-
ture as supreme? Locke resolved the tension through a careful
definition of the meaning of legislative supremacy. The king was
bound by laws that were properly enacted by the Parliament,
and in that sense, the Parliament was supreme, because "what
can give laws to another, must needs be superior to him."l92 The
laws, however, were to be enacted only in accordance with the
legislature's own rules,193 and should be general in nature, "not
to be varied in particular cases."l94 The laws proposed by the
legislature would, moreover, be subject to executive veto,195 and
the legislature could not restrict the executive's "power to act
according to discretion, for the public good, without the pre-
scription of the law, and sometimes even against it."l96 So while
the legislature was formally supreme, the executive-the mon-
arch-retained a freedom of action sufficiently broad and suffi-
ciently vague to prevent the Parliament from reducing him to its
agent.
It remained for Montesquieu to take these tangled strands
of mixed government theory, legislative supremacy, and bal-
anced government, and transform them into what is generally
described as the first articulation of a true separation of powers.
190. For general background on Cromwell's dissolution of the Long Parliament and
his imposition of a Constitution, see, e.g., F. WORMUTH, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM 98-111 (1949).
191. See generally W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1965).
192. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. XIII, § 150 (C. Macpherson ed.
1980).
193. Id. ch. XI, § 136.
194. Id. ch. XI, § 142.
195. See id. ch. XIV, §§ 159-60.
196. Id. ch. XIV, § 160.
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For Montesquieu, as for Locke, only through separating its pow-
ers could a government make a legitimate claim to be governing
its citizens under the rule of law. If the legislature also executed
the law, then those who did any deed under the guise of govern-
ment authority would adjust the law to their liking.197 Although
the traditional notion held that the courts of justice derived
their function from the king-from the executive author-
ity-these, too, had to be rigorously independent of direct exec-
utive or legislative influence.19s Even though Montesquieu's con-
ception of the nature of executive, legislative, and judicial
functions might be in some ways startlingly different from the
American model,199 he was quite clear in his view that some
measure of separation of powers, some system of checks and bal-
ances, was an indispensable prerequisite for the legitimacy of
any government structure that would hold coercive power over
the autonomy of individuals.20o In other words, a government in
which the powers were not separated, with all the friction, com-
petition, and inefficiency that the separation entails, was not a
legitimate government and consequently could make no fair
claim to the allegiance of the governed.
Yet, as a number of students of constitutional history have
recently pointed out, the notion that the powers should be sepa-
rated may be-and, at the time of the Framing, apparently
197. M. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 99, at bk. XI, ch. 6, paras. 4-5.
198. [d. at bk. XI, ch. 6, para. 5 ("[T]here is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not
separated from the legislative and executive.").
199. In particular, Montesquieu viewed the judiciary power as an aspect of the exec-
utive power-as "the executive in regard to things that depend on the civil laws," by
which he meant both criminal punishment and private disputes. See id. bk. XI, ch. 6,
paras. 1-2. Montesquieu, writing against a mixed government background, envisioned
different constituencies in his different branches, and therefore "[h]e did not have to
face Madison's problem of three powers all expressing a single interest (the people's)
...."). G. WILLS, supra note 127, at 121.
200. See, e.g., M. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 99, at bk. XI, ch. 6, para. 42 ("Were the
executive power not to have a right of restraining the incroachments of the legislative
body, the latter would become despotic" because "it might arrogate to itself what au-
thority it pleased"); id. bk. XI, ch. 6, para. 55 ("The legislative body being composed of
two parts, they check one another by the mutual privilege of rejecting. They are both
restrained by the executive power, as the executive is by the legislative."); id. bk. XI, ch.
6, para. 59 ("Were the executive power to determine the raising of public money ...
liberty would be at an end because it would become legislative in the most important
point of legislation."). W.B. Gwyn has argued that Montesquieu's central concern was
with efficiency of the separation of powers, not with the checking function. W. GWYN,
supra note 191, at 104. As the text suggests, I read Montesquieu to suggest the critical
importance of separation and checks primarily in order to reduce the risk of despotism.
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was-understood in several different ways.201 Locke and Mon-
tesquieu argued that the powers of government should be sepa-
rated primarily as a prerequisite to legitimacy. Their main con-
cern was not with how checks and balances might work out in
practice.202 In its practical aspect, a system of separated powers
may be viewed, for example, as promoting efficiency by creating
a division of labor, reflecting what Garry Wills has called a judg-
ment on how "the functions of government [should] be divided
up by ministers in order to get things done."203 There is little to
suggest, however, that the Framers and ratifiers of the American
Constitution had efficiency (as against energy) at the front of
their minds,204 and Professor Wills' conclusion that considera-
tions of efficiency primarily moved Hamilton and Madison is
probably a bit exaggerated.20l> To be sure, as contemporary theo-
rists have pointed out, there is some tension between the con-
cept of a system of checks and balances and the idea that the
powers of government should be separated.206 If the branches of
government must interact in order to check one another, then
the separation of their powers is not a pure one. But in the de-
bates over the ratification of the American Constitution, these
concepts' were quite closely linked to one another and to the
general notion of governmental legitimacy.
When James Madison commented in THE FEDERALIST No.
47 that "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many
201. For a concise review of some of the differing understandings on separation of
powers during the pre-constitutional era, see M. VILE. supra note 180, at 119-75. See also
F. McDoNALD, supra note 178, at 80-87 (differing understandings on Montesquieu).
202. See G. WILLS. supra note 127, at 113 (Locke and Montesquieu "were primarily
concerned with this question of the right to rule rather than the practical problem of
maintaining the separation on which this right is based.").
203. Id. at 109.
204. [T]he Framers of the Constitution were not trying to create a government
that would discern national goals and serve them efficiently and with dispatch;
they were trying to create a limited government that would serve only those
goals that could survive a process of consultation and bargaining designed to
prevent the mischief of factions and the tyranny of passionate majorities or
ambitious politicians.
Wilson, Does the Separation of Powers Still Work?, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1987, at 36,
43.
205. See G. WILLS. supra note 127, at 109-10.
206. See, e.g., M. VILE. supra note 180, at 33 ("The two doctrines are not merely
logically distinct, but to a considerable extent they conflict with each other."); G. WILLS.
supra note 127, at 119 ("Checks and balances do not arise from separation theory, but
are at odds with it.").
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... may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny,"207
he gave voice to a sentiment widely held among those who sup-
ported ratification. "[T]he separation of the executive from the
legislative," William Davie, who had been at Philadelphia, told
the North Carolina ratification convention, is "a principle which
pervades all free governments."208 "[B]lending the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers," John Julius Pringle warned in
South Carolina's convention, "would violate the soundest princi-
ples of policy and government."209 This is all legitimacy language
of the sort used by Locke and Montesquieu. From the available
evidence, it does not appear that any opponents of ratification
contended that a system of separated powers was a bad thing.
Rather, the opposition focused on what was considered the vital
concommitant of that separation: the ability of the branches to
check and balance one another.
The system of checks and balances embodied in the Ameri-
can Constitution occupied far more time at the Philadelphia
Convention than anything else, for a reason that should be obvi-
ous: the 1787 Constitution was primarily a constitution of struc-
ture, a constitution that defined and constituted a government.
Even two hundred years later, when most people probably think
of the document as primarily a device for the protection of indi-
vidual rights, the most cursory examination reveals the compar-
ative wealth of detail with which those who wrote the Constitu-
tion sketched out their vision of how the government would
function.210 A system of carefully balanced and separated powers
was, along with an experiment with new notions of representa-
tion, the cornerstone of this act of constitutional creation.
To be sure, modern political scientists have amply demon-
strated how impoverished a theory the Framers possessed of the
nature and needs of representative government.211 The Framers
understood less than they thought they did about the potential
power of factions and interest groups,212 the advantages enjoyed
207. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 336 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
208. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 103 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES].
209. [d. at 269.
210. I emphasize that the wealth of detail is comparative. Thus, I do not suggest
"that the structural clauses are always more concrete than individual rights provisions or
•.. that they are always clear at all." Carter, supra note 118, at 73.
211. See supra note 115.
212. The inability of the Framers' political science to prevent small, well-organized
groups from developing disproportionate influence in the legislative process is virtually
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by incumbents when they stand for re-election,213 the way in
which a legislature aggregates or fails to aggregate preferences,214
and so forth. But even though the representative character of
the new government was sometimes cited as one check on
abuse,215 the Framers' understanding of the nature of represen-
tation bears at best a tangential relationship to their more gen-
eral concept of a system of balanced and separated powers. In
their consideration of the ways in which the branches would
check each other, as in the considerations of Locke and Montes-
quieu, it mattered only a little how those who would exercise the
various powers were selected, still less precisely who was repre-
sented, as long as the authority that each branch ultimately
would exercise was effectively checked by the others; as long,
that is, as the powers of the government really were balanced
and really were separated.
In the ratification debates, most of the arguments over
checks and balances dwelt on the question whether the Presi-
dent had too much power. This was predictable. Under the Arti-
cles of Confederation, there had been no executive authority
worth mentioning, and an important Federalist goal had been
reining in something they considered far more dangerous than a
strong executive: a legislature with too much power.216 So great
was the fear of the legislature that many delegates to the Phila-
delphia Convention argued strongly against impeachment and
an axiom of modern criticism. The lows classicus (although there are important older
works as well) is M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). For discussions of
some of the problems of organizing interest groups, see, e.g., Orbell, Schwartz-Shea, &
Simmons, Do Cooperators Exit More Readily Than Defectors?, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
147 (1984); Dawes, Orbell, Simmons & Van den Kragt, Organizing Groups for Collective
Action, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1171 (1986). Recent work has also suggested the need to
pay attention to the way in which government actually makes policy - the "supply side"
- which sometimes furthers but often blunts the power of organized interest groups.
See, e.g., Denzau & Munger, Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Inter-
ests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89 (1986).
213. See, e.g., Fiorina & Noll, Majority Rule Models and Legislative Elections, 41 J.
Pol. 1081 (1979); Foster, The Performance of Rational Voter Models in Recent Presi-
dential Elections, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 678 (1984); Nelson, The Effect of Incumbency
on Voting in Congressional Elections, 1964-1974, 93 POL. SCL Q. 665 (1978).
214. See supra note 115.
215. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (J. Madison) (representation in republican
government); THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (J. Madison) (election as check on President); THE
FEDERALIST No. 52 (J. Madison) (election as check on members of House of
Representatives).
216. See G. WOOD, supra note 127, at 403-13.
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against permitting the Congress to override the President's
veto.217
But the Anti-federalists were convinced that the proposed
Constitution had matters exactly backward. Dismayed by the
product of the Philadelphia Convention, the Anti-federalists
listed among their most important complaints the assertion that
the constitutional structure provided too few checks on presi-
dential authority.218 "We are not indeed constituting a British
Government," a disgusted George Mason warned at the Phila-
delphia Convention, "but a more dangerous monarchy, an elec-
tive one."219 "Can you search the President's closet?" Patrick
Henry demanded of Virginia delegates. "Is this a real check?"220
James Monroe-who would later serve as Chief Execu-
tive-gloomily agreed: "I can see no real checks [on the Presi-
dent] in it."221 Sometimes they were quite explicit in their invo-
cation of Montesquieu's ideal. The dissenters from the
Pennsylvania convention's ratification vote complained of a
"dangerous and improper mixture of the executive with the leg-
islative and judicial,"222 while a critic wrote to James Iredell, a
supporter of ratification, speculating on the need for a fresh con-
vention to write a new Constitution, which, unlike the one re-
sulting from Philadelphia, would "secure our political liberty by
separating the executive, legislative, and judicial powers."223
The Federalists were well armed for these arguments. Ham-
217. See, e.g., 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 98 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) (J.
Wilson) [hereinafter RECORDS] (if the Congress can override the veto, it "can at any
moment sink [the executive] into non-existence"); 2 id. at 64-65 (G. Morris) (warning
against rendering the President "dependent on those who are to impeach"). See also 4
DEBATES, supra note 208, at 117 (S. Spencer) (impeachment and veto combine to render
Chief Executive helpless).
218. See generally H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 53-63
(1981); Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Represen-
tative Government, in THE CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CRITICAL ISSUES
56,69-80 (G. Wood ed. 1973). The Anti-federalists would have been more comfortable, of
course, arguing the more central issue-whether the United States should have a strong
national government or whether it (they!) should comprise a union of strong, indepen-
dent states. The product of the Convention and the sentiment of the time foreclosed that
possibility, so they were forced to concede the idea of national government and argue
over whether checks and balances were adequate. See G. WOOD, supra note 127, at 519-
24,547-49.
219. 1 RECORDS, supra note 217, at 101.
220. 3 DEBATES, supra note 208, at 165-66.
221. [d. at 219.
222. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 635 (M.
Jensen ed. 1976) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
223. 15 id. at 364.
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ilton, in THE FEDERALIST No. 69, took pains to set forth the dif-
ferences between the President of the United States and the
King of England. The President, he pointed out, would serve in
office only for four years, not for a lifetime; he could be removed
from office on impeachment by the House of Representatives
and conviction by the Senate; and, unlike the situation in Eng-
land, a two-thirds majority of both Houses of the Congress could
override the executive's veto.224 Tench Coxe, writing pseudony-
mouslyas "An American" in an essay that would be widely re-
printed, responded to the Anti-federalist attack with a point-by-
point rebuttal of the claim that the legislative and executive
powers were intermixed.2211 William Davie assured delegates to
North Carolina's convention that it was "impossible for human
ingenuity to devise any mode of election better calculated to ex-
clude undue influence."226 Charles Pinckney confidently in-
formed South Carolina's ratifying convention that "corruption
was more effectually guarded against, in the manner this govern-
ment was constituted, than in any other that had ever been
formed. "227 Delegate after delegate, with a confidence and a fer-
vor that would astonish modern politicians, insisted in the rati-
fying conventions that the availability of the remedy of im-
peachment would sufficiently rein in presidential abuses of
power.228
Again and again, the Federalists pointed to the role of
checks and balances in the operation of government under their
new Constitution. The adequacy of the checks, as the crucial is-
sue on which the ratification debates turned, was consequently
the key (in the public mind, at least) to the legitimacy of their
system. I have already mentioned Hamilton's exhaustive listing
of the checks on the President in THE FEDERALIST No. 69.
Madison, in THE FEDERALIST No. 47, agreed with the Anti-feder-
alists that "the political maxim, that the legislative, executive,
and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct"
was an "essential precaution in favor of liberty."229 In the next
224. See THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (A. Hamilton).
225. 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 222, at 140-4l.
226. 4 DEBATES, supra note 208, at 122.
227. [d. at 302.
228. See, e.g., 3 DEBATES. supra note 208, at 486 (E. Randolph) ("If he be not im-
peached, he may be displaced at the end of the four years."); 4 id. at 32 (J. Iredell)
(impeachment means President is "amenable for his conduct"); 4 id. at 281 (C. Pinck-
ney) ("No man, however great, is exempt from impeachment and trial.").
229. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 336 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
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paragraph, he repeated the point.230 Yet all of this was only pro-
logue to his argument that absolute separation was not required
and had never been practiced among the several states.231 He
warned in THE FEDERALIST No. 48 that "a mere demarcation on
parchment of the constitutional limits of the several depart-
ments, is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments
which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of gov-
ernment in the same hands."232 And, as he explained in THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, some degree of connection was inevitable,
even desirable, because although "[a] dependence on the people
is, no doubt, the primary control on the government," neverthe-
less, "experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions."233 .
The precautions he had in mind involved building into the
constitutional system a set of checks through which each agency
of government would be able to balance and resist any arroga-
tion of power by another. This system of checks and balances,
far expanded from anything in the political theory of Locke and
Montesquieu, would be the principal means through which the
new government would avoid the tyranny conceded to exist
when the powers were not separated. The system, moreover,
could operate within a branch of government as well as in rela-
tionships among the branches. For example, Madison conceded,
in tones reminiscent of Locke, that the legislature probably
would be dominant in the new government because "it is not
possible to give to each department an equal power of self-de-
fense,"234 but concluded that this risk had a structural separa-
tion remedy: Bicameralism, he explained, would limit the oppor-
tunity for "dangerous encroachments," by the legislature.235
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 reflects the classical republican fear
of corruption and establishes a liberal individualist kind of solu-
tion: "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition."236 Thus,
under the government proposed in the Constitution, "the con-
stant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a
manner as that each may be a check on the other-that the pri-
230. ld. at 336-37.
231. ld. at 337-42.
232. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 347 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
233. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
234. ld.
235. ld. at 357.
236. ld. at 356.
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vate interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the pub-
lic rights."237 This was for the Federalists the ultimate and, they
no doubt thought, the unanswerable rejoinder to the Anti-feder-
alist criticism that the powers were not separated. They are sep-
arated in a sense, the Federalists responded; and to the extent
that they are not, their mixture, because it involves checks and
balances, will further the purpose for which the powers are sepa-
rated-the prevention of tyranny.
What matters about all of this debate is not who was right
and who was wrong, but rather the spin that it placed on the
notion of legitimacy. The ideal the critics clearly had in mind,
the model, too, that the Federalists sought to defend, was one in
which a system of balanced and separated powers operated both
to prevent any single branch from arrogating too large a share of
authority and, a" different and equally important point, to pre-
vent each branch from abusing the powers it did hold. For the
Framers, then, legitimacy-rule in accordance with law-was
not a function of separation alone, as it arguably had been for
both Montesquieu and Locke; it was a function as well of the
degree to which the branches were able to check one another in
the exercise of power.238 Suffice it here to conclude that for the
writers and ratifiers of the Constitution, the separation of pow-
ers and the system of checks on the exercise of power were in-
tended foremost as a means for preventing tyranny, and, as
such, were viewed as vital to the legitimacy of the American con-
stitutional experiment.
B. The Importance of Constitutional Structure
Although modern moral philosophy has added other criteria
for judging the legitimacy of a government,239 the notion that a
237. [d.
238. Checks and balances are, as a matter of intellectual history, an aspect of mixed
government theory, not of separation of powers, and the consensus among modern theo-
rists is that checks and balances are in some tension with separation of powers. See M.
VILE, supra note 180, at 32·34, 53·75; G. WILLS, supra note 127, at 119. However, as
Professor Vile has noted, "[t)hough the theory of mixed government is not logically con-
nected with the theory of separation of powers, the former theory provided suggestive
ideas which formed the basis of the new doctrine." M. VILE. supra note 180, at 34. The
American constitutional achievement involved blending the two in the structure of a sin-
gle government-a democratic republic. "This revolution marked an end of the classical
conception of politics and the beginning of what might be called a romantic view of
politics." G. WOOD. supra note 127, at 606. How depressed the Framers might be to learn
what contemporary political science thinks of their romanticism!
239. I do not mean this statement to be taken as a suggestion that moral philosophy
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government cannot be legitimate unless its most fundamental
powers are separated in a way that checks and balances their
exercise has a continuing intuitive appeal. To imagine a govern-
ment in which all or most authority resides in a single branch or
individual or faction or, as we now must add, party organization,
is to imagine what we today would call a totalitarian state.240
Thus, even today's evolutionary judges and scholars want to pre-
serve some version of balanced and separated powers. It may be
true that the rise of administrative government has drastically
altered the system of checks and balances that the Framers ex-
pected.241 Yet the most ardent advocates of organizing our gov-
ernment institutions so as to maximize deference to (for exam-
ple) scientific expertise ultimately rest their contentions on some
notion of separating and balancing the powers of government.242
So we seem to be a very long way from abandoning the no-
tions that the powers of government should be separated and
that the branches should check and balance the others in the
exercise of their authority. The question, of course, is what par-
ticular system of checks and balances we ought to have. This is a
normative inquiry, and it can be understood in either of two
ways: (a) What is an ideal system of balanced and separated
'powers? (b) What system of balanced and separated powers
ought the courts to enforce? Obviously, if one happens to be-
lieve, as I do not, that constitutional courts in every case should
enforce whatever seems to them ideal,243 the two questions
merge into one, for the answer to (b) is then the answer to (a). I
propose to address only question (b), although in the course of
is determinate or that moral philosophers have reached any consensus. But I also do not
endorse the skeptical position that no moral determinacy can ever exist. See Leff, Law
and Technology: On Shoring Up a Void, 8 01TAWA L. REV. 536 (1976).
240. Perhaps I should not use the term "we"; even on this point, there is no moral
consensus. Cf. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229 (denying
the existence of moral consensus on, inter alia, napalming babies and buying and selling
others).
241. For a particularly clear statement of how the assumptions have necessarily
changed, see Strauss, supra note 52.
242. Thus, even Arthur Kantrowitz, when he offered his controversial proposal for a
"science court," rested his argument on the understanding that a separate institution to
decide scientific questions would improve democratic decisionmaking. See Kantrowitz,
Controlling Technology Democratically, 63 AM. SCIENTIST 505 (1975); Kantrowitz, Pro-
posal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 156 SCI. 763 (1967).
243. I have in mind the theories holding that judges should promote the moral
evolution of the society. See, e.g., C. BLACK, supra note 28; M. PERRY, supra note 28.
Obviously, my choice of textual language is meant as something of a lampoon on theories
that are actually quite sophisticated.
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so doing, I hope to demonstrate the analytical irrelevance of
question (a). In interpreting structural clauses, more than in any
other aspect of constitutional adjudication, courts ought to be
guided by sources more concrete than moral philosophy or their
own intuitions about right and wrong.
1. The need for interpretive rules
To ask what system of separated and balanced powers the
courts ought to enforce is really to ask what text it is that estab-
lishes that system and what interpretive rules the courts should
apply when adjudicating controversies arising under the system.
In all circumstances, interpretive rules are selected with an eye
toward disciplining the act of interpretation. An act of interpre-
tation is always a creative act, because it requires a reader's
choice on how to bound a text, and it calls upon a reader to
exercise her faculties of judgment and imagination.244 The text
invites the reader to imagine possible worlds; without imagina-
tion, the interpretation is not possible.
No text provides its own interpretation. The interpretation,
because the process is a creative one, will vary with the purpose
for which it is undertaken, which is to say, with the rules that
govern the interpretive act.245 I do not mean to endorse the
claim that interpretation is impossible, but rather to reject the
formalist's argument that there is only a single way of defining a
text, that only a single form of interaction between the reader
and the text deserves to be described as "interpretation," and
that this form of interaction leads inexorably to a predetermined
result.246 I also do not mean to contend that rules, in some de-
monstrably neutral way, entail specific, rigorously defined re-
sults.247 I do insist, however, that the interpretive rules make a
244. I take this to be common ground among theorists holding a variety of views on
other aspects of the problem of interpretation. See generally THE POLITICS OF INTERPRE-
TATION, supra note 169 (a collection of essays on interpretation).
245. Stanley Fish, who contends that the relevant interpretive choice is among "dif-
ferent interpretive assumptions" (not the same as rules), is of the view that meaning is
determined neither by text nor by rules, but rather by the assumptions and context of an
interpretive community. See S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS 281-84 (1980);
Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1330 (1984).
246. A principal exponent of this position is E.D. Hirsch, Jr. See E.D. HIRSCH, THE
AIMS OF INTERPRETATION 36-49 (1976); E.D. HIRSCH, VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION 127-63
(1967).
247. See infra text accompanying notes 278-83, 297-309.
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difference. The rules-if they are followed-limit the possible
worlds from which the reader can choose.us
For example, if the morning newspaper's account of the pre-
vious day's baseball game contains Stanton Delaplane's example
of poor sports reporting-the sentence "Snively hit a home
run"249-different readers will add to the text more than the
sentence itself, and will as a result see different images. For one
reader there is a dejected pitcher, head down, spikes scuffing the
dirt; for another a pale spheroid soaring over the center field
fence into a sky of purest eggshell blue; for a third a crowd of
thousands on its feet, cheering, chanting, demanding that the
hero of the moment take a curtain call; and for a fourth a canny
business manager determined to have his client's contract rene-
gotiated while Snively is still larger than life. But if the reader
has been instructed to count the number of home runs that each
member of the team has hit so far this season, there is a disci-
plining interpretive rule which may lead the reader to see noth-
ing on the page except "+1" in the column under Snively's
name. The creative imagination has been reined in. Yet all of
these images are interpretations, and there is no non-tautologi-
cal sense in which anyone of them is more correct than any
other. The image varies with the purpose, which is the same as
saying that the interpretation varies with the rule. Conse-
quently, to speak of a "best interpretation" is really to speak of
a "best interpretive rule," for the correctness of an interpreta-
tion cannot be evaluated until the observer knows what the in-
terpretation is for.2~o
A judge is also a reader possessed of a similar creative imag-
ination, and the judge enjoys a similar relationship to the texts
she is asked to apply. A critic cannot evaluate the judge's per-
formance unless the critic has in mind the interpretive rule that
248. Part of the difficulty with the entire argument is that no matter what an ideal
judge might do, no one seriously supposes that, for example, the Justices of the Supreme
Court of the United States really are striving to follow a consistent set of interpretive
rules. Yet it is necessary to have an ideal before proceeding to critici2e someone's failure
to live up to it, as well as to decide whether to pursue policies that might lead toward (or
away from) the ideal.
249. See Delaplane, The Sporting Way, reprinted in THE THIRD FIRESIDE BOOK OF
BASEBALL 119 (C. Einstein ed. 1968) ("The sports editor was aghast. He said, 'He wafted
the spheroid over the pickets! Can't you write English?' ").
250. Ct. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 194-96 (1985) (using purpose
of adjudication to defend particular ways of selecting interpretive rules to guide
adjudication).
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the judge ought to be applying. The constitutional text may
read, "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws."251 The judge asked to de-
cide how the text applies in a particular case is commonly de-
scribed as explaining what the text "means"; as a practical
matter, the judge's task is to select a rule to discipline the inter-
pretive act. Many different rules may serve a disciplining func-
tion. A judge who believes in enforcing the picture the authors
had of the effect of the clause they were drafting252 will assign a
different meaning than will a judge who seeks to enforce her own
vision of society's moral evolution.253 But a value not typically
thought of as controlling constitutional adjudication can also be
an interpretive rule. A judge whose overriding concern is maxi-
mizing the wealth of the society254 will develop quite a different
image, and thus will assign quite a different meaning, than will a
judge whose motive is to equalize the distribution of that
wealth.255 All of these are interpretive rules, all of them serve the
function of disciplining judicial behavior and all of them seem
capable of a relatively neutral application to a given set of facts.
So if the test of a rule were only whether it constrains interpre-
tation-whether, that is, it does what it is designed to do-they
would all be equally good rules.256
I am not at all certain what standards we should use in test-
ing proposed interpretive rules for disciplining adjudication
under the Constitution's open-ended clauses protecting funda-
mental rights.257 That is a matter of quite passionate scholarly
and judicial debate, and is one which, fortunately, I need not
now join. I am quite convinced, however, that the rules that
guide interpretation of the document's structural
clauses-clauses, for example, like those establishing the system
of balanced and separated powers-should be rules that are ef-
251. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
252. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 363-72 (1977).
253. See M. PERRY, supra note 28, at 99-125.
254. See R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60-115 (1981).
255. See Tushnet, supra note 156, at 424-26.
256. The text implies no judgment on the relative moral worth of these competing
interpretive rules.
257. I have elsewhere extended tentative endorsement to dialogic theories proposing
that the interpretive rules for the relatively indeterminate rights-protecting clauses are
less important than the rules to discipline interpretation of the more determinate struc-
tural clauses. See Carter, supra note 163, at 849-52; Carter, supra note 51, at 845-62.
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fective both in narrowing judicial discretion and in preserving
the contours of the governmental system the Framers designed.
The case for the de-evolutionary tradition strikes me as ir-
refutable in its supposition that there is a link between the legit-
imacy of the judicial function and the nature of the interpreta-
tion of the structural clauses.2li8 A judge who is called upon to
decide a case arising under this political Constitution, this con-
stitution of government structure, takes her very authority to
decide the case from the structural provisions of article III.2li9 If
the case before her also turns on interpretation of a structural
clause, she is in effect construing a clause that is of the same
nature-although it may not be the same clause-as the one
that establishes her function. As a consequence, she ought to be
quite cautious in asserting too broad an authority to use that
clause creatively in the service of some policy goal she may have;
otherwise she is in the same position as the legislature possess-
ing executive powers which, in the political theory of the Fram-
ers' time, and, perhaps, of ours as well, would not govern accord-
ing to law because of its ability to change the rules to provide
post hoc or even simultaneous justification for any arbitrary en-
forcement decision it might reach.260
I suggest only an analogy, not an identity, because the case
the judge is asked to decide may involve, for example, a dispute
between the executive and the legislative branches and will con-
sequently be resolved through interpretation of a different
clause than the one that, in an implicitly de-evolutionary move,
the judge construes,as granting her the authority to decide con-
stitutional cases at all.261 But the clause she must interpret to
decide the case at all and the one she has already interpreted as
granting her the power to decide are of a similar nature. Each
clause addresses the distribution of authority among the
branches of the federal government, and, as a consequence, each
reflects the understanding that resulted from the extended
258. For a similar argument, not all of which I am able to accept, see Easterbrook,
The Influence of Judicial Review on Constitutional Theory, in A WORKABLE GOVERN-
MENT: THE CONSTITUTION AFTER 200 YEARS 170 (B. Marshall ed. 1987) [hereinafter
WORKABLE GOVERNMENT].
259. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution ..••").
260. See M. MONTESQUIEU. supra note 99, at bk. XI, ch. 6, para. 5; J. LOCKE, supra
note 192, at ch. XII, § 143.
261. For an example of a de-evolutionary defense of judicial review based on the
language of article III and its history, see Amar, supra note 28.
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wrangling over needed or appropriate balances and checks that
led to the 1787 Constitution. The judicial interpretive act is sim-
ilar, because in both cases the judge is called upon to set forth
the structural limits on the authority in question even though
she is construing the authority of different branches of the gov-
ernment. The analogy must be admitted to be a very close one,
however, unless the critic is prepared to contend that a judge
should indulge one style of reasoning-one set of interpretive
rules-when her own authority is in issue, and another style
when the power in question belongs to someone else.
As far as I am aware, no one has pressed this contention in
any detail. Jesse Choper, in his controversial "Separation Propo-
sal," has argued for judicial abstention, through the political
question doctrine, when the case requires the Court to decide
whether a particular power is allocated to the President or to
the Congress.262 At the same time, he has argued for an active
judicial defense of the courts' own prerogatives against executive
or legislative encroachment.263 This is not, however, an argument
that the courts ought to follow different interpretive rules for
different structural clauses. It is, rather, a claim that with re-
spect to certain structural clauses-those involving the relative
authority of the President and the Congress-the courts ought
to stop after making the initial interpretive move, the move that
tells the court that no threat to its own authority is involved. I
will have more to say about Dean Choper's proposals pres-
ently.264 For the moment, let it suffice to conclude that even
granting his theory, a call for the courts to interpret different
provisions of the political Constitution in different degrees is not
the same as a call for the courts to interpret those different pro-
visions according to different sets of disciplining rules.
Indeed, it is in a sense counter-intuitive to suggest that dif-
ferent interpretive rules ought to apply to different structural
provisions, for it is difficult to imagine what the relevant differ-
ences might be. By definition, the clauses of the political Consti-
tution are all clauses about the way the government is designed
to operate in practice, and all form part of the system of checks
and balances that was considered by its drafters as a prerequi-
262. J. CHOPER. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 260-379
(1980).
263. [d. at 380-415.
264. See infra notes 327-28 and accompanying text.
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site to legitimacy.265 It is not obvious how one might work out
the meta-rule to determine which structural clauses will be in-
terpreted in accordance with which subsidiary interpretive rules.
Even if one could find a meta-rule, it would only in its turn be
another interpretive rule, for one would still have to apply the
rule to the clauses in order to sort them.
Still, the heaviest service this argument can perform is to
demonstrate that the same interpretive rules ought to be applied
to all structural provisions of the Constitution. An argument
that the rules must be consistent does not by itself say what
those rules ought to be.
2. The better interpretive rules
The evolutionary tradition posits an interpretive rule under
which the judge in effect tests the initiative in question to see
whether it leaves in place a "real" separation of powers in which
"real" checks and balances exist.266 This, however, is a peculiar
fealty to pay to the tradition of separated powers. The phrase
"separation of powers" does not occur in the Constitution; in
fact, nothing approximating it occurs in the Constitution.267
That our constitutional culture has nevertheless enshrined it in
jurisprudence can be attributed in part to an instinct about the
nature of tyranny, but in larger measure to constitutional his-
tory, to our knowledge of the debates over drafting and ratifica-
tion, to the Federalist Papers and similar documents, and to
what we know about the political theory of the time-in short,
to a deeply rooted cultural mythology about the nature of our
government.268 Viewed against this background, the evolutionary
265. See supra text accompanying notes 202-38.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
267. A fortiori, the Constitution does not "spell out the particular form of that the-
ory being endorsed." G. WILLS, supra note 127, at 110.
268. By "mythology" I do not mean to connote "legend," which is to say, I do not
insist that these aspects of our cultural iconography never existed. On the contrary, I
insist on their importance. But a mythology is anything at the heart of a belief system,
whether verifiable or not. Cf. A GREELEY, THE JESUS MYTH 11 (1971).
One intriguing empirical challenge to the line of argument I suggest in text has been
raised by Christopher Collier, a historian who has authored DECISION IN PHILADELPHIA
(1986), a popular history of the Constitutional Convention. He was recently quoted in an
interview to depressing effect: "The public is actually so ignorant about the Constitution
that I don't even think they have any myths about it." Thomas Jefferson Wasn't Even
Near Philadelphia in 1787, The Stamford Advocate, May 3,1987, at A13. One must be
careful, however, to avoid the quick assumption that a public lack of knowledge about
specifics necessarily bespeaks a public opposition to the values that the specifics might
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judge's determination to preserve a system of government in
which the powers are separated and balanced surely stems at
least in part from de-evolutionary roots: A system must be pre-
served because the history demands it.
But if a system of balanced and separated powers is to be
preserved because the history demands it, then why not preserve
the particular system that the history demands? The evolution-
ary judge argues with some force that this approach could stifle
society's creative energies, making it impossible for the govern-
ment to accommodate its organization to the needs of a chang-
ing world. And this, the evolutionary judge frequently adds in
yet another de-evolutionary move, cannot possibly be what the
Framers envisioned. But even evolutionists probably realize that
this argument may prove too much. Mter all, any system of
checks and balances might have these same pernicious effects. I
do not insist that every system does stifle these energies and
make accommodation impossible; only that everyone might. To
be sure, the evolutionary judge would respond that any system
that proved to have these effects could be superseded by a new
one, but that answer in turn proves too little. If the potential for
the defect will always be present, then why insist on reviewing
the new institutional arrangement to ensure that "real" separa-
tion and "real" checks survive? Why not ask instead only
whether the Congress has made a reasonable judgment on effi-
cacy of its new institutional forms, or even, as in Dean Choper's
proposal, dismiss as political questions all separation of powers
controversies not directly affecting the judicial branch?269
A part of the answer might lie in the same political theory
that motivated the original establishment of the system and that
continues to make intuitive sense today; perhaps the evolution-
ary judge still fears that a concentration of unchecked authority
weakens the claim that the government rules in accordance with
law.270 Thus, some degree of "real" separation or balancing is
imply. See Doble, Interpreting Public Opinion: Five Common Fallacies, KETI'ERING
REV., Winter 1987, at 7.
269. See J. CHOPER, supra note 262, at 260-379 (the Separation Proposal), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 262-64.
270. As one evolutionist put the matter:
[T]he main line of tradition, dominant at least since McCulloch v. Mary-
land, is that practical effects, not abstract formulas alone, should guide the
Court in separation of powers cases. This is not to say, of course, that "syllo-
gism" counts for naught; to go that far would be to repudiate the core of
constitutionalism.
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needed if the government is to be a legitimate one. This answer
is thoughtful, but also incomplete and troubling, for the evolu-
tionary judge still lacks a theory to guide adjudication under the
structural clauses. The evolutionary tradition cannot by its very
nature provide a definitive construction of a structural clause;
the interpretation must be open to change as more is learned
about the needs of society and the practical operation of the ap-
paratus of government. Thus, the judge is left instead to work
out in every case whether the power that one branch has appro-
priated is too great, or whether the checks now available over
another are too small. But that approach is a slender reed in-
deed to support a jurisprudence of separation of powers. If a
theory grounded on something concrete guides adjudication,
other political actors can at least make reasonable predictions
about what a court will think of their work. By contrast, the im-
plicit theory of evolution-"Everything is okay unless I think it
goes too far"-carries legal realism to a frighteningly nihilistic
extreme: No one knows what the law is until the courts an-
nounce it.
It seems vital that adjudication under the structural clauses
of the Constitution proceed according to interpretive rules tend-
ing to generate relatively determinate meanings when applied to
those clauses. Not only the judicial branch, but the entire gov-
ernment takes its authority from those clauses. The Framers
and the political theorists who influenced them were correct to
perceive the dangers in a system in which the powers of govern-
ment are not separated and balanced. At the risk of sounding
too unfashionably ontological, it seems apparent that the powers
are separated and balanced better when an observer can see the
separation and see the balances as something actually extant
and comprehensible than they are when the observer cannot.
The less determinate the results yielded by the rules chosen to
discipline the interpretive process, the less apparent the con-
tours of the system will be. If those clauses constituting the gov-
ernment are not interpreted according to rules that yield deter-
minate and predictable results, it is not easy to meet the radical
argument that challenges the legitimacy of American constitu-
tional government by holding even constitutional law to be
empty at its core.271
Elliott, supra note 52, at 125-26.
271. See Carter, supra note 163.
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An evolutionary judge might answer part of this as the Fed-
eralists did during the ratification debates, by asserting that
many of the contours of the system of balanced and separated
powers are obvious, as indeed many of them are: the President
may veto legislation, but the veto may be overridden by a suffi-
ciently large majority;2'12 the President may nominate the judges
and officers of the United States, but the Senate must confirm
them before they can take office;273 the President may be im-
peached by the House and tried in the Senate, but the Chief
Justice presides at the impeachment trial;274 and on and on in
this manner. These clauses, the evolutionary judge could ex-
plain, will be enforced without regard to any de-evolutionary
nonsense, because their enforcement is neither evolutionary nor
de-evolutionary; it simply involves a judgment on clarity as
against lack of clarity. The outline of the system of checks and
balances is plain and clear, the judge could argue; only the less
clear clauses will be interpreted.
Note, however, the premise that all of these examples have
in common. The checks exist because we can read about them
right there in the constitutional text. In form-although, as will
be seen, not in effect-the evolutionist is saying that these
clauses possess meanings so apparent that no interpretation is
necessary. There is something to this claim, because after all, the
government does continue to operate, in accordance with a
broadly shared understanding on constitutional meaning, with-
out the need for constant resort to the courts for interpretation
of the structural clauses.2711 It is not easy, however, to defend the
claim that any clause speaks to the reader in a way that renders
interpretation completely unnecessary.276 That the government
continues to operate may suggest only that, placed in the cur-
rent social and political context, many clauses have been author-
itatively interpreted. That does not make the interpretations
"right"; it means only that the broadly shared interpretations
are supported by a power considerably in excess of the power
possessed by those who consider them wrong.277
272. u.s. CONST. art. I, § 7, d. 2.
273. u.s. CONST. art. II, § 2, d. 2.
274. u.s. CONST. art. I, § 2, d. 5; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
275. See Schauer, supra note 125, at 414-20.
276. See Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (1985).
277. The role of power in establishing authoritative interpretation-and of interpre-
tation in perpetuating repression-is a regular subject of debate in other fields of criti-
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Obviously, the evolutionary judge (like any judge) wants to
buttress her decisions with something more than "We have the
guns,"278 and in effect, the evolutionary judge's response that
some structural provisions are "clear" does reflect a choice of a
correct (to her) interpretive rule. The argument that some
clauses have clear and obvious meanings does not proceed-as
evolutionary analysis typically does-from any assessment of
present-day societal necessities. Rather, it proceeds from a kind
of "plain meaning" rule applied to the structural provisions of
the constitutional text, perhaps-indeed, probably-buttressed
by a historical understanding. In other words, the argument re-
fers to the vision that the Framers held of the way in which the
powers would be balanced and checked. For that reason, the
"plain meaning" argument should be considered a de-evolution-
ary one. It may be, then, that even evolutionary intuition ac-
cords with a de-evolutionary approach. Certainly the evolution-
ary tradition by itself cannot supply the disciplining rules
necessary if interpretation of the structural clauses is to yield
concrete results.
But there is more to the case for a de-evolutionary interpre-
tive rule than this. Any rule, if clearly announced and neutrally
applied, might serve to constrain creative freedom and thus to
generate relatively determinate interpretations of the structural
clauses. I do not mean to reject Wittgenstein's insight (gleefully
embraced by some radical critics of method) that no one can
prove to anyone else, outside a context of shared assumptions,
that any rule applied to a new situation entails a particular re-
sult.279 That conclusion, however, is increasingly powerful in in-
creasingly higher levels of abstraction. At the level of ordinary
conversation within a culture that, like ours, shares assumptions
about constitutionalism and the rule of law, it is useful chiefly as
cism where the stakes are arguably lower than they are when the text at issue is a legal
one. See generally D. HELD, INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL THEORY: HORKHElMER TO
HABERMAS (1980) (criticism in sociology, psychoanalysis and other fields); THE POLITICS
OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 169 (articles on theories of interpretation and criticism in
various areas). That power plays a role in establishing the authority of legal interpreta-
tions should be obvious. That is why the stakes are higher. See Fiss, supra note 250, at
196-97.
278. Ct. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983) (describing judicial action as essentially violent); Cover,
Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) (similar theme).
279. See generally S. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE
(1982) (a discussion of Wittgenstein's paradox and answer with comparisons to other
philosophical skeptic theories).
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Wittgenstein might have intended it all along: as a kind of cau-
tion flag warning us of the dangers of rationalist arrogance. At
the same time, Wittgenstein's insight reminds us that when as-
sumptions are shared, communication is possible.280 A quibble
about the assumptions is no challenge to the central insight.
Thus, within the context of a culture that shares conversa-
tional assumptions, it is possible to talk sensibly about the disci-
plining force of rules. There is a sense in which using shared
assumptions in this way reduces questions of interpretation to
questions of power,281 but this use of the word "power" is an
awkward one. Rather, interpretation in this vision becomes
linked to interpretive consensus, not so much a consensus about
meaning, but a consensus about how meaning is to be found.282
The interpretive rule does not create the consensus, and it also
does not arise from the consensus in any coherent fashion. The
matter is quite the other way around: The existence of the con-
sensus, of a shared context of conversational assumptions, is
what gives the rule its disciplining force.
Evolutionary theory, I have argued, cannot provide rules
that will discipline in any important way. But even if evolution-
280. See id. at 79-113. For particular applications of this understanding in a discus-
sion of legal rules, see Brainerd, The Groundless Assault: A Wittgensteinian Look at
Language, Structuralism, and Critical Legal Theory, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1231 (1985); Fiss,
supra note 250. For precisely this reason-that Wittgenstein's insight might legitimate
rather than destroy legal reasoning-not every critical scholar is a fan. See, e.g., R. UN-
GER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 12 (1984) ("the doctrine easily lapses into com-
placency because it teaches us that we must take communities of sense and value more
or less as we find them").
281. Careful literary critics refer to interpretation as a matter of politics. See, e.g.,
Spivak, The Politics of Interpretation, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION, supra note
169, at 347. When legal polemicists get carried away on this point, analytical caution (to
say nothing of courtesy) may be left behind. See, e.g., Tushnet, Dia-Tribe (Book Re-
view), 78 MICH. L. REV. 694 (1980) (reviewing L. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1979».
282. The perception that rules, although also interpreted, might nevertheless disci-
pline the next interpretive act, and the notion that an interpretive community might
develop a consensus on authoritative disciplining rules combine to form the basis of the
answer offered by Owen Fiss (one of the two most persistent defenders, along with Ron-
ald Dworkin, of the model of adjudication as interpretation) to the critics who deny the
possibility of a constrained interpretation. See Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 1 (1986); Fiss, supra notes 157 & 250. I have elsewhere expressed my doubts
about his suggestion that the legal profession, which he singles out as the relevant inter-
pretive community, either deserves the role of authoritative generator of rules or is capa-
ble of playing it. See Carter, supra note 163, at 835-37. As will become clear, my point in
the present article is that the interpretive understanding of the broader community-of
"We, the People"-is necessarily entitled to consideration in the development of disci-
plining rules; otherwise, continuity in nationhood becomes a sham.
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ary theory does not provide a useful rule, other theoretical ap-
proaches than de-evolution might supply rules readily.283 Thus,
one may concede the case for determinate interpretations and
deny the need for resort to the historical materials so important
to the de-evolutionary judge. A de-evolutionary approach, how-
ever, offers something that no other theoretical construct is
likely to. It supplies a common link among the notions of consti-
tutionalism, government under law, and something that is omit-
ted from too many constitutional theories even though vital to
national survival: a shared sense of continuing nationhood.
The link between the ideals of constitutionalism and gov-
ernment under law is well known. A nation is governed accord-
ing to law when the law is something recognizable and is also
something that binds sovereign as well as citizen.284 Separating
the powers of government was viewed in the political theory of
the Framers' time as promoting this ideal by preventing those
who enforced the law from altering it to suit their arbitrary
desires. A constitution, in this vision, is a particular species of
law, but is law nevertheless. It is fundamental law, constituting
the government as the name implies, but is subject to the same
test: To be law it must be recognizable and must effectively
bind. In our understanding of constitutionalism, this relatively
immutable fundamental law is largely about the process by
which evolving preferences are turned into more mutable law.
Thus, the rule of law is doubly ensured: Not only must the laws
be clear and binding, but they must also be enacted according to
the forms of the Constitution.
The link to our sense of continuing nationhood merits some
further explication. Our Constitution is a species of law, but it is
also something more. It is at its heart a story we tell about our-
selves, a statement of the ideals of our nationhood and of the
283. Thus, there is no reason in principle that one could not discipline interpreta-
tion by requiring the answer that would further some chosen social goal. See supra text
accompanying notes 244-56.
284. As Professor Vile has noted:
There is an essential connection between the notion of government accord-
ing to law and the concept of the functions of government. This connection
forms the basis of the concern with function down through the ages, and is the
explanation of the persistence of this concept in spite of the many attacks
made upon it.
M.J.C. VILE, supra note 180, at 21. Law, in this view, must be recognizable and must
restrict government function, and Professor Vile is correct to remind us of its persis-
tence. This vision is common, for example, to liberal positivist theories of law. See H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 49-76, 97-107 (1961).
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way in which we want our nation to work. I do not insist, al-
though it is possible, that our almost religious enshrinement of a
Constitution few Americans have read, and, to some extent, of
the courts as its prophets, represents a yearning for a lost
Golden Age-the same yearning that characterizes much of the
rhetoric of the de-evolutionary. tradition as well as a significant
part of the political polemicism of our day.
Michael Kammen has suggested that the genius and the
irony of the American constitutional system are reflected in the
curious circumstance that the American people are enormously
proud of their Constitution without really knowing very much
about it.285 Certainly the image of wise and good Framers, who
fought off a monarchy and established the most successful revo-
lutionary government in history, continues to occupy a central
place in American political iconography. The America that cele-
brates the bicentennial of its Constitution also celebrates the bi-
centennial of its Golden Age. That was when the Great Ones
lived, that was when they wrote. The link between their govern-
ment and ours provides us with continuity in nationhood. They
were the Founders who laid down the rules; we are the inheri-
tors, who follow the rules that the Founders laid down. Toc-
queville might have been right in observing that the government
of the United States "depends entirely on legal fictions,"288 but
those fictions are our constitutional inheritance: In the constitu-
tional story that we tell about ourselves, the government that we
have is the one that the Framers designed.
The judge who believes in evolution of the separation of
powers is not immune to the charm of this image. Think back on
the "obvious" contours of the system of balanced and separated
powers and the rigorously de-evolutionary way in which the evo-
lutionary judge tends to construe them. Perhaps even the evolu-
tionary judge who insists that all the government needs to be
legitimate is a "real" separation of powers and a set of "real"
checks actually hopes to discover that the Framers have already
put them in place. Even to this evolutionary judge, while some
parts of the system may change, other parts stay the same.
Thus, the distinction between the traditions may be reduced to
a matter of degree.
285. See generally M KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTI-
TUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986).
286. A. DE TOCQUEVlLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 184 (H. Reeve trans. 1st ed. 1961).
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The concept of continuity is a sensible one to introduce for
another reason as well. If our cultural mythology insists that
"our" government-the Republic to which school children
pledge their daily allegiance-is the one that the Framers
designed, then at least in its fundamentals it is the government
that the people of the United States consider themselves bound
to obey. The people of the United States are the inheritors of
the "We, the People," in whose name the Constitution speaks.
The people may not know the Constitution, but they know of
the Constitution, and the knowledge and belief that the public
shares is the best measure of what they understand their govern-
ment to be.287 If the Congress allocates its authority according to
some intricate contemporary theory, and if that theory runs
sharply contrary to the model operation envisioned when the
powers of the Congress were first set out, then the government's
claim on the loyalty of its citizens is arguably weakened. The
claim is weakened not in some literal sense-I do not suggest the
possibility of popular revolution over the issue of the legislative
veto-but only figuratively: The people think that the wise
Framers designed the government we have, and the Congress
and the courts solemnly pretend that this is so, but know
otherwise.
The problem of "fresh checks" is more readily resolved on
an understanding that seeks to forge links among concepts of
legitimacy, determinacy, and continuity. The term "fresh check"
refers generically to any new institution for controlling the au-
thority of another branch of the government if that new institu-
tion was plainly outside the contemplation of those who
designed the system.288 If the Supreme Court's decisions are bor-
rowed as yardsticks, the legislative veto must be dismissed as a
fresh check;289 so must the judicial implication of a right to sue
the President for compensation for harm he has inflicted in his
287. Thus Frederick Schauer has noted: "The structural provisions of the Constitu-
tion, including and perhaps especially those that never see the judicial system, represent
a critical source of the public's attitude towards this Constitution and towards constitu-
tionalism in general." Schauer, supra note 125, at 403. While I plainly agree with Profes-
sor Schauer's observation, I would not make so strong a claim for popular understanding
about the constitutional clauses protecting individual rights because my intuition-and I
recognize this reason as a weak one-is that the people of the United States do not
cherish the images of the Reconstruction Congress and the Constitutional Convention in
quite the same degree.
288. See supra note 118.
289. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1982).
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official capacity.290 The problem with fresh checks is only par-
tially the dubious constitutional warrant for their creation, for
until one decides which interpretive rule to apply to the struc-
tural clauses, this criticism begs the question. The larger prob-
lem is their potential for mischief in a system of balanced and
separated powers. Whether one views the system developed by
the Framers as sacrosanct or prefers to let the system evolve, the
danger is the same: Deference to the ability of one branch to
create fresh checks on the others leads almost by definition to a
gradual accretion of power in that branch. The constitutional
scheme of separate powers and the equally important system of
checks and balances were designed to prevent just this oc-
curence. There may be an argument for superseding these sys-
tems if they can be shown to have failed; but if real separation
and real balances do in fact matter, it is much harder to see the
argument for setting these systems aside simply because some-
one has a better idea and is able to write a statute, or an execu-
tive order, that reflects the idea.
Not all fresh checks need be deemed unconstitutional on
this approach, and the interpretive rules need not have the ef-
fect of yanking a startled nation back into the eighteenth cen-
tury. The interpretive rule tells the judge what the text means;
but applying that text to the case at hand remains a matter for
prudence and judgment. The preservation of government struc-
ture that I have proposed suggests the need for a difficult judg-
ment on whether a particular initiative violates a fundamental
part of the original understanding on how the nation was to be
governed; it does not suggest a form of originalism that would, in
Erwin Chemerinsky's example that I have already mentioned,
bar women from the presidency.291
Contemporary students of hermeneutics realize that it is in
any case not possible to share the Framers' understanding on
the meaning of the text.292 Those who wrote and ratified the
Constitution communicated in their world, and we communicate
in ours, and the discontinuities between the two are so vast that
290. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
291. See Chemerinsky, supra note 152, at 56.
292. Hermeneuticists would also agree with deconstructionists that meaning does
not exist "within" a text. See Hartman, DECONSTRUCTION AND CRITICISM, supra note 176,
at vii ("Deconstruction. . . refuses to identify the force of literature with any concept of
embodied meaning ...."). They might differ, of course, on the consequence of this
observation.
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we cannot safely assume that they used words to refer to the
things that we imagine when we read the same words. No mat-
ter how thoroughly we research what they said and what they
wrote, we can never by fully sure that we understand all of what
they meant.293
None of this means that originalism is impossible. It does
suggest that originalism cannot perform the feats that some of
its adherents require of it. It cannot bring back the Golden Age
because it cannot provide unambiguous pictures of what that
Golden Age was like. It cannot generate in some mechanical way
a concrete and shared original intention because it cannot pro-
vide unambiguous versions of what the Framers and Ratifiers
must have believed. But the history, to be useful, need not an-
swer all questions unambiguously. And if the proper search is for
those aspects of the history that will provide the continuity that
links our nation with the one the Framers envisioned, the judge
need not pause over every detail. The judge should strive in-
stead to identify those aspects of the system the Framers
designed that were in their view most fundamental to the suc-
cess of their enterprise. One need not capture the full flavor of
what those who designed the presidency expected it to be in or-
der to deduce that they really did mean for there to be only one
President.
Faced with a relatively subtle question involving presiden-
tial authority-the question, for example, whether the Presi-
dent's official conduct ought to subject him to a judicially cre-
ated cause of action for damages by those who are harmed-the
judge naturally has a more difficult time. To argue that there
can be no civil liability because the Framers did not mention it
involves a logical fallacy.294 To argue that there must be civil
damages liability because the Framers did not forbid it involves
the flip side of the same fallacy. But these are rather gross and
grotesque conclusions to draw from something so elusive as in-
293. See Brest, supra note 93, at 218-22. Moreover, even if we have greater faith in
our understanding of the history than contemporary hermeneutics suggests that we
should, it is quite unclear how much faith we should have in the accuracy of the sources.
See Hutson, supra note 159, at 6-35. And if we have faith in the sources, the modern
understanding of the mechanisms of voting might nevertheless call into question the ex-
tent to which the activity of the Framers actually reveals their true preferences on insti-
tutional design. Cf. Riker, The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in
1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1
(1984) (tracing voting "cycles" in decision on how President would be selected).
294. See supra text accompanying notes 159-61.
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tellectual history. The de~evolutionary judge must perform a
more sensitive analysis.
Obviously, the judge will begin with the text, and although
she ought to be aware of who benefits and who is hurt through
the nation's continuing reliance on a "plain" meaning, if she be-
lieves that the meaning is plain, then there is little additional
determinacy to be gained through a more thorough study. If she
is dissatisfied with the result, especially if in the case before her
the outcome seems to be morally repugnant, she had best look to
other constitutional provisions to test her dissatisfaction. In-
deed, those who wrote and ratified the Constitution may well
have expected that in the usual case, the text itself, along with
the canons of statutory construction in wide use in their day,
would provide all the "meaning" that might be necessary.295 But
of course, in most of the difficult modern cases, including Nixon
v. Fitzgerald,29B the case raising the question about civil dam-
ages actions against the President, there is no plain meaning,
whether created by practice or power, to enforce.
The de-evolutionary judge goes to the history; the judge
who is sensitive to hermeneutical problems does so with some
care. The judge should of course read and study the debates and
the history of drafting and ratification and should also try to be
at least a little bit conversant with the larger history of the era.
Through so doing, the judge should endeavor to picture the
broad policy conclusions underlying the system of checks and
balances and to review the delicate balancing, if indeed it ex-
isted, that led to the drafting of the clauses in issue. In the pres-
idential immunity case, the judge performing this research
would discover a long and bitter struggle over the authority of
the President, its limits, and the means for checking his abuse of
authority. She would find the difficult compromise between
those who believed that any independent executive authority
threatened legislative supremacy and ultimately majoritarian
democracy, and those who worried that the legislature might
sink the President into non-existence.297 She would learn of the
general perception, after the economic and political failures of
the Confederation, that the executive must possess considerable
295. See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885 (1985).
296. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
297. See E. CORWIN, supra note 38, at 5-16; G. WOOD, supra note 127, at 430·38;
Carter, supra note 119, at 1357-63.
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freedom and energy, as she would learn of the simultaneous ha-
tred and awe of the British monarch.298 From this and similar
evidence, the judge would try to build up a picture of the Fram-
ers' world, and in the picture she built, she would conclude that
the provisions regarding the punishment of the President had
been worked out with considerable care. The Framers, she might
conclude, had quite a definite model in mind, and it was funda-
mental to their vision of the operation of their system.
This done, she would try to tell them about our world. Ob-
viously, the imagination works hard in this case, but that can
hardly be avoided. She must try to project herself into the de-
bates, to imagine herself outlining our present-day problems,
and to ask whether, armed with foreknowledge, the Framers
mean to enable or forbid our proposed solution. This leaves the
judge considerable freedom-I happen to believe that she would
have to conclude that civil damages liability would not fit snugly
into the system the Framers designed, although others might
disagree299-but the discipline comes in the search, not in the
resolution. The rules have still limited her choice of possible
worlds, and as long as she undertakes the search conscientiously,
as long as she sets out the analysis she has pursued and the rea-
sons for her conclusions as honestly as she is able, she is doing
all that we can ask of a judge. At all events, and whatever her
methodology, her search finally is for evidence of the fundamen-
tal policies of separation and balance on which the concrete
clauses rest; and it is these fundamental policies that she ought
to hold inviolable if fresh checks are to be avoided and if deter-
minacy and continuity are to be preserved.
An example of this interpretive process is provided by the
Court's decision in Bowsher v. Synar.300 The majority concluded
that the delegation of budget-cutting authority to the Comptrol-
ler General was effectively a delegation of executive responsibili-
ties to a legislative officer.30l Possibly this description was accu-
298. See, e.g., G. WILLS, supra note 127, at 87-93 (Hamilton's ambivalence); G.
WOOD, supra note 127, at 132-43 (popular debate).
299. Others do disagree. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARv. L. REV.
62, 226-36 (1982) (precedent does not support decision in Fitzgerald); Note, Presidential
Immunity from Civil Liability, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 236 (1983) (only qualified immunity
should have been granted in Fitzgerald); Note, An Examination of Immunity for Fed-
eral Executive Officials, 28 VILL. L. REV. 956 (1983) (Fitzgerald decision characterized as
"inconsistent and inequitable").
300. 106 S.Ct. 3181 (1986).
301. Id. at 3191-92.
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rate, but in jumping from that discovery to a conclusion of
unconstitutionality, the majority escaped far too easily from the
need for judgment. Justice White's dissent, on the other hand,
went too far in the other direction, for reasons already dis-
cussed,302 and Justice Blackmun's separate dissent was to much
the same effect.303 Justice Stevens, however, whose opinion con-
curring in the judgment was joined by Justice Marshall, got the
matter exactly right. In Justice Stevens's view, the Gramm-Rud-
man-Hollings delegation was unconstitutional for precisely the
same reason that the legislative veto was unconstitutional:
[T]he powers assigned to [the Comptroller General] under the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act require him to make policy that
will bind the Nation;. . . when Congress, or a component or an
agent of Congress, seeks to make policy that will bind the Na-
tion, it must follow the procedures mandated by Article I of
the Constitution-through passage by both Houses and pre-
sentment to the President. In short, Congress may not exercise
its fundamental power to formulate national policy by delegat-
ing that power to one of its two Houses, to a legislative com-
mittee, or to an individual agent of the Congress such as the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Sergeant at Arms
of the Senate, or the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office.304
What emerges from Justice Stevens's opinion is a picture of the
way in which the Congress is to make policy, a picture derived
from his reading of the constitutional history.30li To him it did
not matter whether the power delegated to the Comptroller
General could be called "executive" or not; what mattered was
only that the Congress had effectively delegated to the Comp-
troller General an authority which, in the vision of the Framers,
was to be exercised in a particular way.306 The bicameralism and
presentment requirements are not, on this view, mere clumsy
historical artifacts to be circumvented as the need arises. They
are instead the fundamental checks that the Framers provided
against the possibility of legislative tyranny.30? On the theory
that I have presented, the more fundamental the check, the less
302. See supra text accompanying notes 54-65.
303. 106 S.Ct. at 3215-20.
304. [d. at 3194.
305. [d. at 3203-05.
306. [d. at 3205.
307. [d. at 3203.
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freedom a de-evolutionary Congress or a de-evolutionary judge
should have to ignore it.
The effort to supply determinate answers. in separation of
powers cases does not require that the history be sufficiently
clear and compelling that only one result is conceivable. Were
this the requirement, there would be no need to screen judges
for anything other than their ability to understand historical
materials and to read and write the English language. But we
require of our judges much more than this, and while they are
not, perhaps, the dedicated philosopher-scholars of Alexander
Bickel's attractive vision/o8 they are nevertheless expected to do
more than simply calculate and regurgitate-they are expected
to judge. This means that they must exercise their own reason-
ing ability and, in particular, the faculty of creative imagination.
This facility of the mind enables the judge, through a choice
among possible worlds, to translate the symbols of the text into
a meaning and to apply that meaning to resolve a legal dis-
pute.309 There is a balance that must be struck: How clear is the
history? How did the Framers envision the working of the sys-
tem? How fundamental was their vision? How different from
this vision is the proposed fresh check? How close to the line
does the challenged initiative fall? In short, even when the inter-
pretation of the text is determinate or nearly so, the judge still
has a good deal of work to do. What matters throughout is that
the judge be guided by the basic de-evolutionary principles that
I have mentioned, that the judge try to develop an image of the
way in which the Framers hoped the government would func-
tion, and that the judge make that image the begin-
ning-although perhaps not the end-of the analysis.
There are costs to applying interpretive rilles designed to
limit the ability of each branch to enclose fresh checks on the
others, and the costs are not trifling. There is a certain loss in
government efficiency; there is a weakening of the ability of the
nation to respond to every crisis with the institutional form that
308. See A BICKEL, supra note 126, at 25-26 ("Judges have, or should have, the
leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the
ends of government.").
309. The judge's experience over the years and the professional requirements of
craft will naturally tend to channel the judge's creative freedom. Ct. Deutsch, Neutral-
ity, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political
Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 233 (1968) ("To substitute 'logic' for 'experience' in consti-
tutional adjudication • . . would be to dispense altogether with the judicial process, at
least the judicial process as known in the United States and in England.").
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experts who have studied the problem think best. But these
costs are outweighed by the benefits of rendering the structure
of government, including its checks and balances, relatively de-
terminate and, in consequence, more legitimate, as well as of
paying homage to some uniquely American aspects of our consti-
tutionalism by keeping the government of the United States rea-
sonably close to the one envisioned by those whose choices most
Americans believe still rule.
Still, Americans, like the scholars who occasionally purport
to speak for them, are a restive bunch, impatient with a govern-
ment that does not solve the problems of society with the requi-
site degree of alacrity. The demand for a balanced budget, if the
demand in fact exists, may typify this restiveness; the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings statute, a thinly-veiled effort at heading off
the potentially disastrous call for a constitutional convention to
balance the budget,310 may typify the tendency of politicians to
lurch from one crisis to the next, responding to public demands
as best they can on the spur of the moment, often seeming to
dare the courts to do anything about it. The courts cannot, of
course, force the Congress to legislate right. But in the de-evolu-
tionary tradition, they may play a vital and active role in keep-
ing it from legislating wrong.
V. THE NECESSARY VITALITY OF THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE
And yet this theory plainly is not sufficient. There may be
cases, for example Synar or Chadha, in which the de-evolution-
ary judge can tell, if not easily then at least with a fair degree of
certainty, that the congressional initiative violates one of the
fundamental tenets on which the Framers organized their sys-
tem of balanced and separated powers. There may be other
cases, such as Dames & Moore v. Regan311 or United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,312 wherein the de-evolutionary
judge can judge that the challenged institutional arrangement
meshes well with the model the Framers envisioned. But surely
310. The call for a convention is most troubling to those who do not believe that the
Congress possesses the constitutional authority to limit the subjects that the convention
might consider. Compare Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited" Constitu-
tional Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623 (1979) with Van Alstyne, The Limited Constitu-
tional Convention-The Recurring Answer, 1979 DUKE L.J. 985.
311. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
312. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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there will be many other cases arising under structural clauses,
perhaps even a majority of the cases in which the rules I have
recommended will not lead to any relatively determinate inter-
pretation of the constitutional clause in question, or in which,
having reached one, the Justices will have trouble applying it to
the case at hand. In cases of this nature, the deference called for
by the evolutionary tradition is due, for there is no clear image
of the world the Framers envisioned, and there is consequently
nothing to hark back to.3l3 The judge faced with a new institu-
tional form and no answer to the question whether it fits snugly
into the model the Framers designed ought not consider herself
free to disturb what the political branches have achieved. She
need not give it judicial blessing, but she cannot pronounce it
anathema. Fortunately, a means for holding this middle ground
already exists: the political question doctrine.
The political question doctrine, whether viewed as a consti-
tutional imperative3l4 or as one of Alexander Bickel's semi-
discretionary passive virtues,3l5 has been, at least since Coleman
v. Miller3l6 in 1939, an important arrow in the judicial quiver.
Contemporary judicial discussions of the doctrine typically begin
by quoting this language from Justice Brennan's majority opin-
ion in Baker v. Carr:3l7
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly ac-
cording to the settings in which the questions arise may de-
scribe a political question, although each has one or more ele-
ments which identify it as essentially a function of the
separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found a textually demon-
strable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political de-
cision already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from
313. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
314. Ct. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (political question doctrine is "es-
sentially a function of the separation of powers").
315. See A. BICKEL, supra note 126, at 111-98.
316. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
317. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.318
Louis Henkin, among other critics, has pointed out that much of
this taxonomy-even the venerable "textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment" category-involves issues of judg-
ment rather than deference.319 A court that rules that another
branch has the authority to decide an issue is nevertheless con-
sidering the limits of the authority of the second branch and is
implicitly determining that with respect to the activity at issue,
the second branch has not exceeded those limits.
In recent years, moreover, the courts have shown no fond-
ness for the political question doctrine. Baker v. Carr itself was
certainly a case in which no standard could be found in the Con-
stitution, and therefore, as Justice Frankfurter suggested, the
challenge to Tennessee's legislative apportionment should per-
haps have been dismissed as nonjusticiable.320 But in Reynolds
v. Sims,321 the Court did "discover" a standard, a "right of a
citizen to equal representation and to have his vote weighted
equally with those of all other citizens,"322 or, as we tend now to
think of it, one-person, one-vote. To say that this standard was
derived from the fourteenth amendment, as the Court insisted
that it was, is at least a little bit disingenuous. Yet, as John Ely
has pointed out, this principle is perhaps the most splendid ex-
ample of successful constitutional creation. It has become an ac-
cepted and valued part of the political and even the moral
landscape.323
So perhaps, judged against its popular acceptance, the
Court's refusal to find a political question in Baker v. Carr has
been a success. But after Baker and the equally intriguing crea-
tivity in Powell v. McCormack,324 it is difficult to imagine any
important case being dismissed as a political question, and in-
deed, the Justices have reserved that treatment for relatively
unimportant cases. For example, the Supreme Court has ruled
318. Id. at 217.
319. See Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597
(1976).
320. 369 U.S. at 277-325 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
321. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
322. Id. at 576.
323. "Anyhow, the critics were wrong on this one: the equal weighting of everyone's
vote turned out to be a notion with which most people could sympathize." J. ELY, supra
note 47, at 121.
324. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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that the Senate has the final say on who has "received more law-
ful votes" in an election for a Senate seat.325 But the outrage
that would follow a gross effort on the part of the Senators to rig
the election is probably sufficient security against a Senate ac-
tion that might lead to serious litigation. In an age of massive
leaks to the mass media, counting the votes is little more than a
ministerial act. Other cases wherein the Court has found ques-
tions to be political are not significantly more substantial than
this.326 There is in fact little left of the political question doc-
trine, if indeed it ever was a real doctrine, but for reasons that
will be explained, judges committed to the ideal of a relatively
determinate political Constitution, marked by the continuity of
which I have written earlier, ought to be trying to resurrect the
doctrine, or at least to breathe fresh life into it.
The political question doctrine is, in fact, not quite dead,
and in separation of powers controversies it may be close to a
revival. Jesse Choper's "Separation Proposal," under which vir-
tually all separation of powers cases would be considered politi-
cal questions,327 is an important step in that potential revitaliza-
tion. Dean Choper, although he may have carried his point a bit
far, is surely on to something when he contends that no matter
how plainly the history demonstrates the Framers' intentions
with respect to the separation of powers, "[i]t by no means fol-
lows. . . that the framers intended the Court to enforce the sep-
aration of powers or that judicial review is necessary to resolve
constitutional clashes between Congress and the President."328
Even if, as I have proposed, the Court ought to intervene when
the government has deployed its authority in sharp violation of
the rules the Framers thought they were establishing, it hardly
follows that the Court must have something to say about the
merits of every case in which the separation of powers argument
is raised. Although the process of judicial review, as Charles
Black has pointed out, serves to legitimate the day-to-day func-
tioning of the government even as it singles out some govern-
ment actions for prohibition,329 clear judicial approval or disap-
proval of a government decision is not required in every case.
325. See Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972).
326. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (Congressional authority to or-
ganize and regulate the militia).
327. See J. CHOPER, supra note 262, at 260-379.
328. [d. at 265. ,
329. See C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 56-86 (1960).
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Sometimes even the de-evolutionary tradition is better served if
the courts defer.
The political question doctrine represents the modern
Court's most important tool for deference, and the tool is poten-
tially quite a useful one.330 But political question cases come in
more than one variety. The more common sort analyzed by
Louis Henkin in his critique of the Court's political question ju-
risprudence,331 is the case in which the Justices purport to be
deferring to the legislative judgment on' a "political" question,
whereas what they are really doing amounts in practical terms to
determining whether the legislative action falls within some
sphere of reasonableness-which is not really deference at all,
but review.332
But political question cases come in another variety as well.
In this second set of what might be called "pure" political ques-
tion cases, the deference is real, because the Justices make no
determination whatever about the allowable scope of legislative
or presidential authority. The best recent example of a political
question case of this sort is Goldwater v. Carter.333 Faced there
with a challenge by a handful of Senators and Representatives
to President Carter's decision to abrogate the mutual defense as-
sistance pact between the United States and the Republic of
China, four Justices pronounced the question a political one, not
because the President had acted reasonably, but because in this
"dispute between coequal branches of our Government,"334 there
was no basis in constitutional language or history for the Court
to determine whether the Senate in fact should play a role in
deciding whether to terminate a treaty.3315
Justice Powell, who would have dismissed the suit on other
grounds,336 criticized this reasoning, arguing that the plurality
opinion in effect was dismissing the action because deciding the
case would be difficult.337 The application to text and history of
330. But also a dangerous one. See Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Vir-
tues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1 (1964).
331. See Henkin, supra note 319.
332. Id. at 600-01.
333. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
334. Id. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., and Stevens, .J.,
concurring).
335. Id. at 1003.
336. Id. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring).
337. Id. at 999.
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"normal principles of interpretation,"338 he wrote, would ade-
quately resolve the case.339 This response, however, is not quite
to the point, and it misses the de-evolutionary force of the
course the plurality preferred. The plurality's point was not that
resolution was difficult but that under the standards of interpre-
tation that the four Justices preferred to apply resolution was
impossible. A de-evolutionary approach, seeking to discover the
model on which the Framers hoped the treaty-making and
treaty-ending powers would function, did not yield any determi-
nate result.3'0 In that circumstance, a judge who accepts the de-
evolutionary tradition cannot possibly feel free to disturb the
status quo. The political question doctrine-the real one, the
pure one-serves as a moderating gloss on the de-evolutionary
tradition and will still permit a degree of institutional evolution
if the de-evolutionary judge turns to it whenever her preferred
interpretive methodology leaves matters indeterminate. Without
the doctrine-with an obligation to decide every case-the de-
evolutionary judge would in effect be forced to abandon the de-
evolutionary tradition.
Dean Choper's conclusion that all disputes between the
President and the Congress should be left for resolution by these
overtly political branches, cuts strongly against the grain of the
entire theory on which the de-evolutionary judge premises her
jurisprudence. His view necessarily considers the separation of
powers as a historical artifact of a previous generation's misun-
derstanding of effective division of government powers. It ig-
nores the possibility that separation in and of itself might be
attractive as a bulwark against tyranny.3'l It lends neither deter-
minacy nor continuity to the constitutional system of balanced




340. I am here making certain obvious-and possibly unwarranted-assumptions
about the meaning of the plurality opinion.
341. Dean Choper anticipates this criticism in his book, arguing in response that
although the Framers plainly intended separation of powers as one bulwark against tyr-
anny, there is no evidence that they expected the courts to enforce it. J. CHOPER, supra
note 262, at 266-70. But there is precious little evidence that they anticipated any signifi-
cant part of what we now imagine when we think of judicial review, a point that he
acknowledges. See id. at 266. Dean Choper willingly accepts judicial review in other con-
texts. See id. at 60-128 (judicial review is indispensable for protecting individual rights);
id. at 380-415 (judicial review is appropriate when courts are protecting themselves).
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Under the Separation Proposal, for example, Immigration
and Naturalization Service v. Chadha342 should have been dis-
missed as a political question, because the only issue was
whether the power at issue resided in the executive or the legis-
lative branch-not whether the power could be exercised by the
government at all.343 Yet the presentment clause difficulty
presented by the legislative veto was perfectly plain, and be-
cause presentment was a fundamental part of the Framers' re-
strictions on the ability of the Congress to work its will, that
difficulty would be decisive under the de-evolutionary theory de-
fended in this article. The fact that the dispute was in a sense
between the political branches344 would not cause the de-evolu-
tionary judge to hesitate over whether to decide the case because
the key to the judge's "pure" political question doctrine is not
the identity of the parties or even of the issues, but rather the
nature of the result yielded when the judge applies the proper
interpretive rules to the text.
Still, the line between determinate and indeterminate re-
sults is not a bright one, and the de-evolutionary judge should
not rush to dismiss a suit as a political question merely because
the answer is at first unclear. As already mentioned, the role of
the judge involves creativity and imagination, and those facul-
ties, cabined though they are by the interpretive rules that I
have proposed, must be applied with a will when the interpreta-
tion proves a difficult one. In the end, perhaps the judge still will
be unable, even through an act of guided imagination, to conjure
a picture of the vision the Framers held of the operation of the
check or balance in question. This, I presume, is what happened
as the Justices in the plurality tried to analyze the issue in Gold-
water v. Carter.345 And at that point, it seems entirely appropri-
ate for the Court to indulge the judicial equivalent of throwing
up one's hands in despair, that is, to declare the question a po-
litical one to be resolved by the political branches between one
another.
This conclusion highlights an aspect of the political ques-
342. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
343. See J. CHOPER, supra note 262, at 357-60 (arguing that constitutionality of leg-
islative veto should be nonjusticiable).
344. I say "in a sense" because Chadha was a private party claiming harm. The
Separation Proposal necessarily rejects the notion (outside of the due process clause)
that Chadha might have a right to have the government proceed against him only
through the forms set forth in the Constitution.
345. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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tion doctrine, as well as of the operation of our political system,
that is sometimes overlooked or misunderstood. The resolution
of an issue between the Congress on the one hand and the Presi-
dent on the other may be effected by means bearing only the
most tenuous relation-or no relation at all-to the issue at
hand. If the Senate is annoyed at the President for terminating
a treaty without its consent, the constitutional structure does
not leave the matter for decision only through a statute di-
recting the President to desist, a statute the President might
then defy, bringing about fresh litigation. The Senate (and the
argument can be expanded, mutatis mutandis, to the House of
Representatives or the Congress as a whole) possesses a host of
weapons that it might bring to bear in political confrontation. If
the President refuses to back down, he might find his cronies
facing a more difficult time achieving confirmation for judge-
ships and ambassadorships. He might not receive funds for the
programs he cherishes and might be forced to accept dramatic
increases in funds for programs he abhors. As I noted on an ear-
lier occasion, "One need only consider the vast range of positions
for which Senate confirmation is required to realize the potential
for congressional limitation of the executive inherent in the con-
firmation power."346
There is some reason to believe that those who designed the
system of checks and balances assumed that the Congress would
act in this fashion, indeed, that they expected and counted on a
politically charged relationship between the electorally account-
able branches as vital to the success of their scheme.347 If indeed
this is so, then judicial deference, through the political question
doctrine, in cases of an indeterminate text should promote ad-
herence to the Framers' original vision. If litigation is not always
(or perhaps not often) an available strategy, those who are dis-
satisfied with the action of one of the electorally accountable
branches might be forced to run for redress to the other, and
perhaps in that way the political battle might be joined.
In the same sense, it is possible to imagine judicial intrusion
when the text is unclear as itself constituting a kind of fresh
check. If the Framers planned on an overtly political resolution
of a category of problems, then judicial interference would upset
346. See Carter, supra note 119, at 1390.
347. On this point, Dean Choper and I entirely agree. See J. CHOPER, supra note
262, at 268·70; Carter, supra note 119, at 1384-94.
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the balance. Thus, the political question doctrine, more than
providing a means for deference when the interpretive ruIes that
have been advocated yield no clear resuIt, may well be an ines-
capable concomitant of de-evolutionary theory. Put otherwise,
the historical investigation that the de-evolutionist demands can
reveal much more than the concrete design and the fundamental
policies underlying it; the investigation might reveal as well a
broadly shared understanding that some questions are by their
nature political and the expectation that the political branches
wouId resolve these disputes between themselves. That, too,
wouId be a historical discovery that the de-evolutionary judge is
bound to respect.
VI. A PRECAUTIONARY AFTERWORD: THE COSTS OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM
None of this means that the application of these ruIes to the
decision of particular cases will be easy, and none of it means
that in hard cases judges should not continue to be guided by
practical wisdom no less than by abstract theory.348 It is not my
intention, moreover, to provide a theoretical underpinning for a
sudden dismantling of the administrative state or for a sudden
reversal of the flow of authority from the Congress to the
President.
A pure de-evolutionist might have difficuIty justifying the
rise of administrative government, and there is a disquieting as-
pect to the establishment of ruIe-making and rule-enforcing
agencies that are independent of direct legislative or executive
supervision.349 The Framers had a view on who wouId make pol-
icy and who would carry it out, and that view did not include a
role for these somewhat bizarre governmental institutions. Yet
perhaps even for the de-evolutionist (at least on the softened
version that I have proposed) there comes a point when evolu-
tion really does matter, when, as Justice Frankfurter suggested
348. I recognize the complexity of my claim, but rather than try to defend it here, I
will defer to the far more eloquent statement by the late Alexander Bickel. See A
BICKEL, supra note 126. See also Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence,
94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985).
349. Indirect political supervision is of course a fact of regulatory life. This argu-
ment is offered both in support of the agencies, see, e.g., Strauss, The Place of Agencies
in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573
(1984) (parity of supervision by Congress and the President preserves the Constitution's
intent); and in dismissal, see, e.g., B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR
(1981) (calling for greater independence of expert agencies from political control).
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in the Steel Seizure Case, the government has operated in a
particular way for so long a time that it no longer makes sense to
speak of a Constitution that requires something else.Sl5O And per-
haps, although it is impossible to draw a bright line to divide the
cases in which the evolution has passed that point from the
cases in which it has not, we can nevertheless state with confi-
dence that the role of independent administrative agencies falls
on one side of that line, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings formula
on the other.
Perhaps. But the other side of the argument, although
frightening in its implications, may be the stronger. Perhaps we
can find no warrant, in constitutional tradition or in liberal po-
litical theory, for the establishment of independent agencies.Sl51
Perhaps a government that operates through these independent
boards and commissions is really a lawless one, in the classical
sense, wherein the same people, the regulators, make the rules,
enforce them, and interpret them. Perhaps these agencies are
acting according to a delegation of legislative power forbidden in
classical liberal theory. Perhaps there is no argument from con-
stitutional history that can possibly render these independent
agencies legitimate. And so perhaps, in our de-evolutionary zeal,
we ought to put an end to them.
Bruce Ackerman, in his Storrs Lectures, has sought to sail
to the rescue of the administrative state with the suggestion
that, in effect, the people themselves ratified the role of inde-
pendent agencies in the 1936 elections because the nation's
politics, for a brief period of intensive debate, moved to the
higher level that they had occupied at the time of the ratifica-
tion of the original document.Sl52 This argument in effect seeks to
justify evolutionary developments in a de-evolutionary, although
also discontinuous, way. Judicial approval of the administrative
agencies does violence to nothing that is in the Constitution, the
argument runs, because it harks back to the original understand-
ing shared by those who in practical terms adopted a constitu-
tional amendment to permit those agencies to function.Sl5S The
350. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
351. I make more of this possibility (without taking a position in the rich evolution-
ary v. de-evolutionary debate on the subject) in Carter, The Beast that Might Not Exist:
Some Speculations on the Constitution and the Independent Regulatory Agencies in
WORKABLE GOVERNMENT, supra note 258 at 76.
352. See Ackerman, supra note 172, at 1049-57.
353. Id. at 1051-57, 1070-72.
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argument respects the virtue of determinacy, but more impor-
tant, it rests on a vision of the continuity necessary to na-
tionhood: This administrative Golden Age may be more recent,
many of the Framers may still be alive, but they are due the
same homage as those who have been dead for nearly two
centuries.
Professor Ackerman's rescue mission, however, may founder
on the same shoals that have broken up many other proposals
for interpretive rules: There may be no adequate rule of recogni-
tion to let the observer know which elections involve constitu-
. tional politics, and, in consequence, the implicit ratification of
some otherwise contra-constitutional development, and which
elections are mere normal landslides, in which the policies in is-
sue have no constitutional dimension. In short, the theory may
eventually provide a means of rescue, but it does not do so yet.
So despite Professor Ackerman's effort and some others,3lS4
the argument for demolition of the administrative state has not
yet met with a convincing de-evolutionary refutation. Nor is the
difficulty limited to the administrative agencies. What about the
President, who almost since the original ratification of the Con-
stitution, has been siphoning power from the Congress primarily
because of the need to respond rapidly to crises that do not ad-
mit of quick legislative solutions? Is he, too, to be reined in, his
powers circumscribed, those of the Congress drastically
augmented?
Here the de-evolutionary judge stands on much firmer
ground in permitting the status quo to continue. The strands of
power that the President has gathered around him, particularly
in the foreign affairs realm, are not necessarily with him forever.
The Court has repeatedly approved presidential exercises of au-
thority that some might have thought belonged to the Congress
(the Steel Seizure Case was a departure from this trend), but
only in cases where the Congress has raised no legislative objec-
tion.3lSlS The Congress may have acquiesced in presidential deci-
sions that augment his authority, but the acquiescence need not
354. See, e.g, Strauss, supra note 52.
355. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (President may con-
strue statute as granting him authority to suspend private claims against a foreign power
unless the Congress objects); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 349-55 (1952) (President
as Commander-in-Chief may establish military tribunals unless the Congress limits his
authority to do so); Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260 (1909) (President as Commander-
in-Chief may administer captured territories by fiat until the Congress acts).
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continue; at any time, the Congress might change its collective
mind.3156 As I put the point in an earlier essay:
All these cases stand quite plainly for the proposition that the
President can exercise a purportedly inherent power if Con-
gress has historically acquiesced and if Congress does not try
to stop him. If Congress does try to stop him, then by defini-
tion it is no longer acquiescing. In a fluid and dynamic system
of checks and balances, this is the only conclusion that makes
sense. It is surely not the case that all that is, is constitutional,
so absent some constitutional equivalent of adverse possession,
what Congress has given, Congress CEm also take back.3157
In short, one need not be an evolutionist to defer, perhaps
through the political question doctrine, when the claim is raised
that the President is exercising as "inherent" a power that is
actually the legislature's to control. I do not refer to a case in
which the argument is pressed that the President is actually leg-
islating; I refer only to the case in which the claim is made that
he requires congressional permission for what he is doing. Gold-
water v. Carter and Dames & Moore v. Regan are cases of this
nature.
The de-evolutionary judge can call the questions raised in
such cases as these political, but they remain so only until legis-
lation is in place challenging the President's authority to do
what he seeks to do. At that point, the de-evolutionary judge has
to decide whether the power at issue is one that the Framers
thought that the Congress should be able to control. As Charles
Black has pointed out, in nearly every case the answer should be
"Yes."3158 The Framers had reason to be wary of the Congress as
potentially the most dangerous branch. It is.
VII. CONCLUSION
All of this leaves most substantive constitutional doctrine
pretty much where it is. The Supreme Court's reasoning in cases
arising under the system of balanced and separated powers is
often shaky, but its results are generally where they should be.
356. "The one fundamental error is that of supposing that the modem expansion of
presidential power is based on the Constitution by itself, and is hence inaccessible as a
matter of law to congressional correction." Black, The Working Balance of the American
Political Departments, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 20 (1974).
357. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV.
101, 124 (1984).
358. See Black, supra note 356, at 15.
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That is a problem for supporters of legislative vetoes and other
innovative means through which the Congress may try to par-
ticipate in day-to-day policy-making; and, conceivably, it is a
problem as well for supporters of strong and independent ad-
ministrative agencies. But decrying the recent line of de-evolu-
tionary decisions as a return to "formalism" is, in the end, an
irrelevant sidestep. If the American constitutional democracy is
to be government under the rule of law, the degree of doctrinal
coherence matters. A determinate governmental structure is
more legitimate than an indeterminate one. The weakness of the
evolutionary tradition is, in the end, its inability to render gov-
ernment structure determinate.
Determinacy, separation of powers, and a system of checks
and balances do not tell the whole story of legitimacy. The sepa-
rate parts of a government with an unambiguous constitutional
foundation might unite to repress a minority, or even a majority,
of the.governed. Or a government might find itself so steeped in
checks and balances that private forces involved in exploitation
of others are able to block any initiative to end the exploitation.
In short, a government wholly concerned with the governing pro-
cess, a government with no conception of or interest in rights, is
not likely to prove itself a legitimate one. On the other hand, a
government with little concern for the democratic process-even
a totalitarian government, a dictatorship-might still protect the
rights of its citizens, apart from the right to participate in their
own governance. This course would not render the government
more legitimate; it would remain an outlaw, albeit, perhaps, a
relatively humane one.3119
The obsession of contemporary constitutional dialogue, per-
haps for good reason, has been seeing to it that the government,
whether outlaw or not, remains humane.36o The instrument
359. Allusions to literature are supposed to go unexplained; that is why they are
called allusions rather than citations. This allusion, however, might require a citation:
Oh, Watson, he was a sort of Robin Hood type-robbing the rich and giv-
ing to the poor. Of all the buccaneers in history, I really find him one of the
most sympathetic. Now, I certainly do not wish to condone his obvious disre-
spect for the law. Nevertheless, in all justice to him, it must be added that for
an outlaw, he was a remarkably humane one!
R. SMULLYAN, THE CHESS MYSTERIES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 84 (1979) (quoting Holmes).
360. A judicial review based on moral vision might be described in these terms. This
I take to be the point of Michael Perry's suggestion, see M. PERRY, supra note 28, that
the best test for legitimacy is whether, over time, the Court produces a moral vision with
which most Americans generally agree. The Court may in a sense be operating outside
the bounds of the Constitution-it might be an "outlaw"-but in time the people come
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charged by liberal constitutional scholars with preserving that
humaneness is the judicial system. Setting forth the rules that
the courts ought to follow in preserving the humaneness consti-
tutes an important mission for scholarship aimed at improving
our system of government, but not a sufficient one. If the gov-
ernment is to be legitimate, then it must not be an outlaw, no
matter how well intentioned; and constitutional theorists who
want to keep the government law-abiding have an obligation to
consider matters of structure as well as questions of right. A lack
of attention to the substantive results of governance is only one
kind of oppression. A lack of attention to its forms and processes
is another. My defense of an essentially de-evolutionary ap-
proach to separation of powers questions is an effort to take
those pro~esses seriously, by supplying to interpretation of the
constitutional structure the qualities of determinacy and con-
tinuity that serve in turn as keys to legitimacy. My goal, in other
words, is to see to it that whether humane or not, the govern-
ment does not become an outlaw.
No doubt there are other approaches that can serve the
same purpose, and some of them may be better than the one
here proposed. But the one that I suggest possesses the some-
times forgotten practical virtue of meshing well with the work
that the Supreme Court is already doing. So many constitutional
theories would require for their implementation a radical re-
statement of prevailing doctrine. Radical discontinuity is not al-
ways a bad thing-American slavery, for example, might not
have ended without it-but it is both unrealistic and profoundly
threatening to the notion of government under law to suppose
that the courts can or should readily implement whatever theory
has most recently caught academic fancy. Sometimes theory
might demand too much change: in the constitutional story that
we tell about ourselves, it is important to hold things together.
to see it as humane. There is an echo of the same theme, albeit carefully camouflaged, in
the work of John Ely. In his monograph on judicial review, he proposes that judges, in
the cause of justice, might sometimes be driven by desperation to decisions without re-
gard to law, which he labels "civil disobedience." J. ELY, supra note 47, at 183. He might
as well have said that the courts might sometimes be forced to be outlaws-but remarka-
bly humane ones.
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